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Abstract
We show that even when the exchange rate cannot be devalued, a small set of con-
ventional ﬁscal instruments can robustly replicate the real allocations attained under a
nominal exchange rate devaluation in a dynamic New Keynesian open economy envi-
ronment. We perform the analysis under alternative pricing assumptions—producer or
local currency pricing, along with nominal wage stickiness; under arbitrary degrees of
asset market completeness and for general stochastic sequences of devaluations. There
are two types of ﬁscal policies equivalent to an exchange rate devaluation—one, a uni-
form increase in import tariﬀ and export subsidy, and two, a value-added tax increase
and a uniform payroll tax reduction. When the devaluations are anticipated, these
policies need to be supplemented with a consumption tax reduction and an income tax
increase. These policies are revenue neutral. In certain cases equivalence requires, in
addition, a partial default on foreign bond holders. We discuss the issues of implemen-
tation of these policies, in particular, under the circumstances of a currency union.
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Gene Grossman, John Leahy, Elias Papaioannou, Veronica Rappoport, Ricardo Reis, Richard Rogerson,
Martín Uribe, Adrien Verdelhan, Michael Woodford and seminar/conference participants at NES-HSE, ECB,
Frankfurt, Princeton, Federal Reserve Board, Columbia, NBER IFM, Wharton, NYU, Harvard, MIT, NY
Fed, LSE for their comments, and Eduard Talamas for excellent research assistance.1 Introduction
Exchange rate devaluations have long been proposed as a desirable policy response to macroe-
conomic shocks that impair a country’s competitiveness in the presence of price and wage
rigidities. Milton Friedman famously argued for ﬂexible exchange rates on these grounds.
Yet countries that wish to or have to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate cannot resort to ex-
change rate devaluations. In this paper we show how a country can use unilateral ﬁscal policy
to generate the same real outcomes as those following a nominal exchange rate devaluation,
while keeping the nominal exchange rate ﬁxed.
This question about ﬁscal devaluations dates back to the period of the gold standard when
countries could not devalue their currencies. At that time, Keynes (1931) had proposed that
a uniform ad valorem tariﬀ on all imports plus a uniform subsidy on all exports would have
the same impact as an exchange rate devaluation. Recently, it has also been conjectured
that a similar outcome could be achieved by increasing value-added taxes and cutting payroll
taxes (e.g., social security contributions).
The current crisis in the Euro area has brought ﬁscal devaluations to the forefront of
policy. The Euro has been blamed for the inability of countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Italy and even France to devalue their exchange rates and restore their competitiveness in
international markets.1 Faced with the dramatic alternatives of austerity-ridden internal
devaluation and exit from the Euro, countries in the Eurozone are considering the option
of ﬁscal devaluations. Indeed, in 2012, France has implemented a ﬁscal devaluation. Pre-
vious examples include Denmark in 1988, Sweden in 1993, and Germany in 2006. Fiscal
devaluations have clearly become a serious policy option.
Despite discussions in policy circles, there is little formal analysis of ﬁscal devaluations.2
This is an area where the policy debate is ahead of academic knowledge. This paper is
intended to bridge this gap, by providing the ﬁrst formal analysis of ﬁscal devaluations in
a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium New Keynesian open economy environment.3 In
doing so, we learn under what circumstances the tariﬀ-cum-subsidy and VAT-cum-payroll
ﬁscal interventions suﬃce to attain equivalence and when they need to be supplemented with
additional policy adjustments.
1For popular policy writings on the topic see, for example, Feldstein in the Financial Times (February 17,
2010), Krugman in the New York Times (May 1, 2010), and Roubini in the Financial Times (June 13, 2011).
2For policy discussions, see for example Farhi and Werning (2007), Cavallo and Cottani (2010), IMF
Press Release on Portugal (May 5, 2011), and IMF’s September 2011 Fiscal Monitor.
3We adopt the New Keynesian framework with nominal rigidities as it provides the most natural labora-
tory for studying the real consequences of a nominal devaluation, however, our equivalence results between
nominal and ﬁscal devaluations generalize beyond the models with nominal frictions.
1We deﬁne a ﬁscal devaluation of size t at date t to be a set of unilateral ﬁscal polices that
implements the same real allocation as under a nominal exchange rate devaluation of size t,
but holding the nominal exchange rate ﬁxed. We explore a general path of t, including both
expected and unexpected devaluations. Since the nature of price rigidity—whether prices
are set in the currency of the producers or in local currency—is central for the real eﬀects of
nominal devaluations (see, for example, Lane, 2001; Corsetti, 2008), we allow for both the
cases of producer (PCP) and local currency pricing (LCP) and for nominal wage rigidity.4
Additionally, we allow for a wide range of alternative international asset market structures,
including complete markets, and various degrees of incompleteness such as international
trade in risk-free nominal bonds only or international trade in equities.
We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, despite the fact that the actual allocations induced by devaluations in
New Keynesian environments are sensitive to the details of the environment, there exists a
small set of ﬁscal instruments that can robustly replicate the eﬀects—both on real variables
and nominal prices—of nominal exchange rate devaluations across all speciﬁcations. The
exact details of which instruments need to be used depend on the extent of completeness of
asset markets, the currency denomination of bonds and the expected or unexpected nature
of devaluations. Second, the required adjustment in taxes is only a function of t, the
size of the required devaluation, and is independent of all details of the environment, such
as for example the degree of wage and price stickiness, and the type of pricing (local or
producer currency). Third, when all proposed tax instruments are used a ﬁscal devaluation
is government revenue neutral. Otherwise, we show that these policies generate additional
government revenue in periods of trade deﬁcits.
We study both types of ﬁscal devaluations—a uniform increase in import tariﬀs and
export subsidies and a uniform increase in value-added taxes and reduction in payroll taxes.
The dynamic analysis reveals that both of these policies, in general, need to be accompanied
by a uniform reduction in consumption taxes and an increase in income taxes.5 However,
under some circumstances, changes in consumption and income taxes can be dispensed
with. Whether this latter option is possible depends on the extent of completeness of asset
markets and whether the exchange rate movements that are being mimicked are anticipated
or unanticipated.
To provide intuition for the underlying mechanisms, consider the case of producer cur-
4PCP refers to the case when prices are sticky in the currency of the producer (exporter), while LCP is
the case when prices are sticky in the currency of the consumer (importer) of the good.
5A consumption tax is equivalent to a sales tax that is applied only to ﬁnal goods, and not to intermediate
goods. In our setup all goods are ﬁnal, and hence consumption and sales taxes are always equivalent. Further,
under the tariﬀ-based policy, an increase in income tax should extend to both wage income and dividend
income, while under the VAT-based policy, the dividend-income tax should be left unchanged.
2rency pricing (PCP). One of the channels through which a nominal devaluation raises relative
output at home is through a depreciation of home’s terms of trade that makes home goods
cheaper relative to foreign goods. This movement in the terms of trade can be mimicked
either through a combination of import tariﬀ and export subsidy or through an increase in
the value-added tax (which is reimbursed to exporters and levied on importers). Addition-
ally, to ensure that prices at home are the same as under a nominal devaluation, an increase
in the value-added tax needs to be oﬀset with a reduction in the payroll tax. The relative
prices of all goods then respond identically under a ﬁscal and nominal devaluation.
When is a reduction in consumption taxes and an increase in income taxes required?
Without a reduction in consumption taxes, ﬁscal devaluations result in an appreciated real
exchange rate relative to a nominal devaluation. This is because ﬁscal devaluations, despite
having the same eﬀect on the terms of trade, lead to an increase in the relative price of the
home consumption bundle—an eﬀect absent under nominal devaluation. This diﬀerence is
of no consequence for the real allocation when trade is balanced or when the devaluation is
unexpected and asset markets are incomplete, as neither risk-sharing nor saving decisions
are aﬀected under these circumstances. As a result, precisely in these two cases, we can
dispense with the adjustment in consumption taxes.
By contrast, with expected devaluations, in the absence of an adjustment in consumption
taxes, the diﬀerent behavior of the real exchange rate under nominal and ﬁscal devaluations
induces diﬀerent savings and portfolio decisions. These eﬀects then need to be undone with a
reduction in consumption taxes. This allows to fully mimic the behavior of the real exchange
rate under a nominal devaluation. When the consumption tax is used, an oﬀsetting increase
in income taxes is required so as not to distort the labor supply decision of households.
In the case of incomplete markets we highlight the role of the currency denomination of
debt. When bonds are denominated in the foreign currency or in the case of equities, no
additional instruments are required for a ﬁscal devaluation. By contrast when international
bonds are denominated in the home currency, the proposed set of tax instruments does not
suﬃce. Equivalence then requires a partial default by the home country.
Importantly, when all four taxes (e.g., VAT, payroll, consumption and income taxes)
are used, the policy is revenue-neutral for the government. That is the direct eﬀects of tax
changes on the ﬁscal deﬁcit add up to zero as the revenue earned from the VAT and income
tax increases exactly oﬀset the revenue declines that follow the payroll and consumption tax
cuts. The indirect eﬀects on revenue that arise from the stimulative eﬀects of a ﬁscal deval-
uation on output, however, remain exactly as in the case of an exchange rate devaluation.
When only a reduced set of tax instruments is used, such as VAT and payroll tax only, a
3ﬁscal devaluation generates positive ﬁscal revenues in states when the country runs a trade
deﬁcit.
We consider a series of extensions that are important for implementation. One of these
is the implementation of ﬁscal devaluations by individual countries in a currency union in
a multi-country environment. We show that equivalence is retained for eﬀects on countries
both within and outside the union across nominal and ﬁscal devaluations. We also show that
when the devaluing country is small relative to the overall size of the currency union and/or
where seigniorage income constitutes a negligible share of a country’s GDP, a country within
a currency union can engineer a ﬁscal devaluation unilaterally without any coordination with
the union central bank.
Finally, we provide a numerical illustration of ﬁscal devaluations by calibrating to the
recent experience of Spain. We allow for capital and adjustment costs in capital accumulation
and realistic taxes in an environment with wage rigidity. The 2008 crisis is modeled as the
outcome of a borrowing cost shock that generates a decline in output, consumption and
investment similar to those observed in Spain. We show that a nominal devaluation of 10%
eliminates the output decline and essentially replicates the ﬂexible wage allocation. We then
compare welfare changes across various cases of complete and incomplete ﬁscal devaluations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 presents the main
equivalence results. Section 4 analyzes several extensions, such as implementation in the
currency union, capital inputs, and asymmetric pass-through of taxes. Section 5 provides
a numerical illustration of the equilibrium dynamics under nominal and ﬁscal devaluations
against that under ﬁxed exchange rates and passive ﬁscal policy. Section 6 concludes. Tech-
nical proofs are relegated to the appendix.6
Related literature: The tariﬀ-cum-export subsidy and the VAT increase-cum-payroll tax
reduction are intuitive ﬁscal policies to replicate the eﬀects of a nominal devaluations on
international relative prices, and accordingly have been discussed before in the policy and
academic literature. Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers (1986) emphasize the fact that
tax changes that would otherwise be neutral if prices and wages were ﬂexible have short-
run macroeconomic eﬀects when prices or wages are sticky. Most recently, Staiger and
Sykes (2010) explore the equivalence using import tariﬀs and export subsidies in a partial
equilibrium static environment with sticky or ﬂexible prices, and under balanced trade.
While the equivalence between a uniform tariﬀ-cum-subsidy and a devaluation has a long
6A supplementary online appendix, available on the authors websites, contains omitted standard deriva-
tions and additional results, including a simple static model to illustrate the main results of this paper.
4tradition in the literature (as surveyed in Staiger and Sykes, 2010), most of the earlier
analysis was conducted in static endowment economies (or with ﬁxed labor supply).7 Our
departure from this literature is to perform a dynamic general equilibrium analysis with
varying degrees of price rigidity, alternative asset market assumptions and for expected and
unexpected devaluations.
This paper is complementary to Adao, Correia, and Teles (2009) who show that the
allocation in the ﬂexible price, ﬂexible exchange rate economy can be implemented with
ﬁscal and monetary policies that induce stable producer prices and constant exchange rates.8
This general implementation principle however does not help answer the question of whether
there is a robust and small set of conventional ﬁscal instruments that can replicate the eﬀect
of a nominal devaluation which is the focus of our paper. Importantly, in Adao, Correia, and
Teles (2009), since optimal policy is sensitive to the details of the environment, the ﬁscal
instruments used will vary across environments and in general will require time-varying and
ﬁrm-varying taxes, in contrast to the main results in our paper.9
Our paper also complements the work of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011), who show
that in an environment with downward wage rigidity and inelastic labor supply, the eﬀects
of a nominal devaluation can be replicated with a payroll subsidy alone, a result that does
not extend to the more general environment considered in our paper. Finally, our work is
also related to Lipińska and von Thadden (2009), Franco (2011) and Boscam et al. (2011)
who quantitatively evaluate the eﬀects of a tax swap from direct (payroll) taxes to indirect
taxes (VAT) under a ﬁxed exchange rate.
2 Model
The model economy features two countries, home H and foreign F. There are three types
of agents in each economy: consumers, producers and the government, and we describe each
in turn. We then discuss which assumptions of our setup can be further relaxed.
7The VAT policy with border adjustment has been the focus of Grossman (1980) and Feldstein and
Krugman (1990), however, in an environment with ﬂexible exchange rates and prices. Berglas (1974) provides
an equivalence argument for nominal devaluations, using VAT and tariﬀ-based policies, in a reduced-form
model without micro-foundations. Calmfors (1998) provides a policy discussion of the potential role of VAT
and payroll taxes in impacting allocations in a currency union.
8Eggertsson (2004) makes a similar observation in a simpliﬁed log-linearized model. In the same spirit,
Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles (2011) build on the general implementation results of Correia, Nicolini,
and Teles (2008) to replicate the eﬀects of the optimal monetary policy at the zero-lower bound.
9In addition, the policy implementation in Adao, Correia, and Teles (2009) requires taxes both at Home
and in Foreign. By contrast, our ﬁscal devaluation policies rely only on adjusting taxes at Home, which
is an important practical advantage, as these policies can be implemented unilaterally. Furthermore, their
implementation relies on income taxes and diﬀerential consumption taxes for local versus imported goods.
These taxes are less conventional than payroll and value-added taxes—tax instruments that have been
proposed as potential candidates in policy circles (e.g., see IMF, 2011).
52.1 Consumers
The home country is populated with a continuum of symmetric households. Households are
indexed by h 2 [0;1], but we often omit the index h to simplify exposition. In each period,
each household h chooses consumption Ct, money Mt and holdings of assets fB
j
t+1gj2Jt,
where Jt is the set of assets Jt available to the households. Each household also sets a wage
rate Wt(h) and supplies labor Nt(h) in order to satisfy demand at this wage rate.
The household h maximizes expected lifetime utility, E0
P1
t=0 tU(Ct;Nt;mt), subject to
the ﬂow budget constraint:
PtCt
1 + &c
t
+ Mt +
X
j2Jt
Q
j
tB
j
t+1 
X
j2Jt 1
(Q
j
t + D
j
t)B
j
t + Mt 1 +
WtNt
1 + n
t
+
t
1 + d
t
+ Tt;
where Pt is the consumer price index before consumption subsidy &c
t and mt = Mt(1+&c
t)=Pt
denotes real money balances. t is aggregate proﬁts of the home ﬁrms assumed (without loss
of generality) to be held by the representative domestic consumer; n
t is the labor-income tax,
d
t is the proﬁt (dividend-income) tax, and Tt is the lump-sum transfer from the government.
An asset j is characterized by its price Q
j
t and eﬀective payout D
j
t reﬂecting possible defaults
and haircuts on the asset.
For convenience of exposition we adopt the following standard utility speciﬁcation:
U (Ct;Nt;mt) =
1
1   
C
1 
t  

1 + '
N
1+'
t +

1   
m
1 
t :
Consumption Ct is an aggregator of home and foreign goods:
Ct =


1

HC
1 

Ht + 
1

FC
1 

Ft
 
 1
;   0;
that allows for a home bias, H = 1   F 2 [1=2;1]. The consumption of both home and
foreign goods is given by CES aggregators of individual varieties i 2 [0;1] with elasticity of
substitution  > 1: Ckt =
h 1
0 Ckt(i)( 1)=di
i=( 1)
for k 2 fH;Fg.
We now discuss some of the relevant equilibrium conditions associated with consumers’
optimal decisions. Given the CES structure of consumption aggregators, consumer good
demand is characterized by:
Ckt(i) =

Pkt(i)
Pkt
 
Ckt; Ckt = k

Pkt
Pt
 
Ct; (1)
where i is the variety of the home or foreign good (k 2 fH;Fg). Pkt(i), Pkt and Pt are
respectively the price of variety i of good k, the price index for good k and the overall
consumer price index. As is well known, CES price indexes are deﬁned by
Pt =
h
HP
1 
Ht + FP
1 
Ft
i 1
1 
and Pkt =
h 1
0 Pkt(i)1 di
i 1
1 
; k 2 fH;Fg; (2)
6and the aggregate consumer expenditure is given by PtCt = PHtCHt+PFtCFt with PktCkt =
 1
0 Pkt(i)Ckt(i)di.
It is useful to deﬁne the nominal stochastic discount factor of a household:
t;s  
s t

Ct+s
Ct
  Pt
Pt+s
1 + &c
t+s
1 + &c
t
; s  t; (3)
and we use t+1  t;t+1 for brevity. This discount factor prices available assets:
Q
j
t = Et

t+1
 
Q
j
t+1 + D
j
t+1
	
; 8j 2 Jt: (4)
Finally, money demand is given by
C

t

Mt
Pt=(1 + &c
t)
 
= 1   Ett+1; (5)
where the right-hand side is an increasing function of the nominal risk-free interest rate
which satisﬁes 1 + it+1 = 1=Ett+1.
Foreign households We assume that foreign households face a symmetric problem with
the exception that the foreign government imposes no taxes or subsidies and foreign con-
sumers have a home bias towards foreign-produced goods. We denote foreign variables with
an asterisk. For brevity we omit listing all equilibrium conditions for foreign given the sym-
metry with home. Deﬁne J
t to be the set of assets available to foreign households and

t  Jt \ J
t to be the set of assets traded internationally by both domestic and foreign
households. The equilibrium in the world asset market requires B
j
t + B
j
t = 0 for all j 2 
t
since we assume all assets are in zero net supply.
The foreign-currency nominal stochastic discount factor is given by


t;s = 
s t

C
s
C
t
  P 
t
P 
s
(6)
Since the Euler equations (4) for assets j 2 
t are satisﬁed for both countries, we can write
international risk sharing conditions as:
Et
(
Q
j
t+1 + D
j
t+1
Q
j
t

t+1   

t+1
Et
Et+1
)
= 0 8j 2 
t; (7)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate, and the foreign currency depreciation rate (Et=Et+1)
converts the home-currency asset returns into foreign-currency returns. The risk sharing
condition (7) states that domestic and foreign stochastic discount factors agree in pricing
the internationally-traded assets. It also implicitly assumes that any default or haircut is
uniform for domestic and foreign holders of the assets, and that the adopted ﬁscal policies
do not act as capital controls.
72.2 Producers
In each country there is a continuum i 2 [0;1] of ﬁrms producing diﬀerent varieties of goods
using a technology with labor as the only input. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i produces according to
Yt(i) = AtZt(i)Nt(i)
; 0 <   1; (8)
where At is the aggregate country-wide level of productivity, Zt(i) is idiosyncratic ﬁrm
productivity shock, and Nt(i) is the ﬁrm’s labor input. Productivity At, fZt(i)g and their
foreign counterparts follow arbitrary stochastic processes over time.
The ﬁrm sells to both the home and foreign market. Speciﬁcally, it must satisfy de-
mand (1) for its good in each market given its price PHt(i) at home and P 
Ht(i) abroad in
the foreign currency. Therefore, we can write the market clearing for variety i as:10
Yt(i) = CHt(i) + C

Ht(i); (9)
where C
Ht(i) is foreign-market demand for variety i of the home good. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i
is given by

i
t = (1   
v
t )PHt(i)CHt(i) + (1 + &
x
t )EtP

Ht(i)C

Ht(i)   (1   &
p
t )WtNt(i); (10)
where v
t is the value-added tax (VAT), &x
t is the export subsidy and &
p
t is the payroll subsidy.
Note that this equation makes it explicit that exports are not subject to the VAT, or more
speciﬁcally VAT is rebated back to the ﬁrms upon exporting.11 We deﬁne the prices to be
inclusive of the VAT, export subsidy and import tariﬀ, but exclusive of the consumption
subsidy &c
t. Aggregate proﬁts of the home ﬁrms are given by t 
 1
0 i
tdi and aggregate
labor demand is Nt =
 1
0 Nt(i)di.
2.3 Price and wage setting
Firms set prices subject to a Calvo friction: in any given period, a ﬁrm can adjust its prices
with probability 1   p, and maintains its previous-period price otherwise. The ﬁrm sets
prices to maximize the expected net present value of proﬁts conditional on no price change,
P1
s=t s t
p Et

t;si
s=(1 + d
s)
	
, subject to the production technology and demand equations
given above, and where d
s is the dividend-income (or proﬁt) tax payed by stock holders.
We now need to make an assumption regarding the currency of price-setting. We assume
that domestic prices are always set in the currency of the consumer and inclusive of the VAT
10Note that overall demand for good i results from aggregation of demands across all consumers h 2 [0;1]
in the home and foreign markets respectively, e.g. CHt(i) =
 1
0 CHt(i;h)dh.
11The proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm is i
t = P
Ft(i)C
Ft(i)+
1 
v
t
(1+m
t )EtPFt(i)C
Ft(i) W
t N
t (i) in foreign currency,
and its exports are subject to both the VAT and the import tariﬀ m
t paid at the border.
8tax. We denote the domestic period t reset price of ﬁrm i by  PHt(i), so that ﬁrm’s i current
price is given by
PHt(i) =
8
<
:
PH;t 1(i); w/prob p;
 PHt(i); w/prob 1   p:
(11)
The foreign price can be set either in the producer currency, often referred to as producer
currency pricing (PCP), or in the local currency, referred to as local currency pricing (LCP).
Producer currency pricing Consistent with the standard deﬁnition of PCP we assume
that the ﬁrm chooses the home-currency reset price  PHt, while the foreign-market price
satisﬁes the law of one price:
P

Ht(i) = PHt(i)
1
Et
1   v
t
1 + &x
t
; (12)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate deﬁned as the price of one unit of foreign currency
in terms of units of home currency, hence higher values of Et correspond to home currency
depreciation. In words, the ﬁrm sets a common price  PHt(i) for both markets, and its
foreign-market price equals this price converted into foreign currency and adjusted for border
taxes—the export subsidy and the VAT reimbursement. The reset price satisﬁes the following
optimality condition, standard in the New Keynesian literature (see Galí, 2008, and our
derivation in the online supplement):
Et
1 X
s=t

s t
p t;s
P

Hs(CHs + C
Hs)
1 + d
s

(1   
v
s)  PHt(i)  

   1
(1   &p
s)Ws
AsZs(i)Ns(i) 1

= 0: (13)
This implies that the preset price  PHt(i) is a constant markup over the weighted-average
expected future marginal costs during the period for which the price is in eﬀect. Equations
(11)–(13) together with the deﬁnition of the price index in (2), describe the evolution of
home ﬁrms’ prices in the home and foreign markets under PCP.
Local currency pricing Under LCP the ﬁrm sets both a home-market price  PHt(i) in
home currency and a foreign-market price  P 
Ht(i) in foreign currency. During periods of
non-adjustment, the foreign-market price remains constant in foreign currency, therefore
movements in the nominal exchange rates and border taxes directly aﬀect the relative price
of the ﬁrm in the home and foreign markets. As a result, the law of one price (12) is violated
in general. Proﬁt maximization with respect to  PHt(i) and  P 
Ht(i) leads to two optimality
conditions, one for the home-market price and the other for the foreign-market price (see
9the online supplement):
Et
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d
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
= 0; (14)
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s)Es  P
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
   1
(1   &p
s)Ws
AsZs(i)Ns(i)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
= 0; (15)
describing the evolution of prices (combined with (11), now for both markets) under LCP.
Foreign ﬁrms As for price setting by foreign ﬁrms, the reset prices of each foreign variety
in the foreign market  P 
Ft(i) and in the home market  PFt(i) are characterized in a symmetric
manner to that of the home economy, with the exception that all foreign tax rates are kept
at zero. Under PCP, the law of one price holds for all foreign varieties:
PFt(i) = P

Ft(i)Et
1 + m
t
1   v
t
; (16)
where m
t is home’s import tariﬀ charged at the border together with the home’s VAT v
t
imposed on the foreign imports. Under LCP, foreign ﬁrms set their home-market price in
home currency according to:
Et
1 X
s=t

s t
p 

t;sP

FsCFs

1   v
s
1 + m
s
1
Es
 PFt(i)  

   1
W 
s
A
sZ
s(i)N
s(i) 1

= 0: (17)
Labor demand and wage setting Tha labor input Nt is a CES aggregator of the in-
dividual varieties supplied by each household, Nt =
h 1
0 Nt(h)( 1)=dh
i=( 1)
with  > 1.
Therefore, aggregate demand for each variety of labor is given by
Nt(h) =

Wt(h)
Wt
 
Nt; (18)
where Nt is aggregate labor demand in the economy, Wt(h) is the wage rate charged by
household h for its variety of labor services and Wt =
h 1
0 Wt(h)1 dh
i1=(1 )
is the wage
for a unit of aggregate labor input in the home economy. The aggregate wage bill in the
economy is given by WtNt =
 1
0 Wt(h)Nt(h)dh.
Households are subject to a Calvo friction when setting wages: in any given period,
they may adjust their wage with probability 1 w, and maintain the previous-period nom-
inal wage otherwise. The optimality condition for wage setting is given by (see the online
supplement):
Et
1 X
s=t

s t
w t;sNsW
(1+')
s


   1
1
1 + &c
s
PsC

s N
'
s  
1
1 + n
s
 Wt(h)1+'
W
'
s

= 0: (19)
10This implies that the wage  Wt(h) is preset as a constant markup over the expected weighted-
average between future marginal rates of substitution between labor and consumption and
aggregate wage rates, during the duration of the wage. This is a standard result in the New
Keynesian literature, as derived, for example, in Galí (2008). Wage setting (19), together
with the wage evolution analogous to (11), characterize equilibrium wage dynamics.
2.4 Government and country budget constraint
We assume that the government must balance its budget each period, returning all seignior-
age and tax revenues in the form of lump-sum transfers to the households (Tt). This is
without loss of generality since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model. The government
budget constraint in period t is
Mt   Mt 1 + TRt = Tt; (20)
where Mt   Mt 1 is seigniorage income from money supply. The tax revenues from distor-
tionary taxes TRt are given by
TRt =

n
t
1 + n
t
WtNt +
d
t
1 + d
t
t  
&c
t
1 + &c
t
PtCt

(21)
+


v
t PHtCHt   &
p
t WtNt

+

v
t + m
t
1 + m
t
PFtCFt   &
x
t EtP

HtC

Ht

;
where the ﬁrst bracket contains income taxes levied on and the consumption subsidy paid
to home households; the next two terms are the value-added tax paid by and the payroll
subsidy received by home ﬁrms; the last two terms are the import tariﬀ and the VAT paid
by foreign exporters and the export subsidies to domestic ﬁrms.
Combining this together with the household budget constraint and aggregate proﬁts, we
arrive at the aggregate country budget constraint:
X
j2
t
Q
j
tB
j
t+1  
X
j2
t 1
(Q
j
t + D
j
t)B
j
t = EtP

HtC

Ht   PFtCFt
1   v
t
1 + m
t
; (22)
where the right-hand side is the trade surplus of the home country and the left-hand side is
the change in the international asset position of the home country.12
This completes the description of the setup of the model. Given initial conditions and
home and foreign government policies—taxes and money supply—the equations above char-
acterize equilibrium price and wage dynamics in the economy. Given prices ﬁrms satisfy
product demand in domestic and foreign markets, and given wages households satisfy labor
12Formally, B
j
t =
 1
0 B
j
t(h)dh is the aggregate net foreign asset-j position of home households.
11demand of ﬁrms. Asset prices are such that asset markets are in equilibrium given asset de-
mand by home and foreign households, and consumer money demand equals money supply
in both markets.
2.5 Assumptions
Before turning to the results of our analysis, we highlight that several of the assumptions
made in the model setup to ease exposition can be generalized without impacting our results.
These include assumptions on:
Functional forms We assume CES consumption aggregators and monopolistic compe-
tition, but the results hold under more general environments. For instance, our results
generalize to the case of monopolistic competition with non-constant desired markups (e.g.,
as under Kimball, 1995, demand), as well as to the case of oligopolistic competition with
strategic complementarities (e.g., as in Atkeson and Burstein, 2008). Departing from CES
consumption aggregators and monopolistic competition substantially increases the nota-
tional burden, but leaves the analysis largely unchanged. We can also allow for a general
non-separable utility function in consumption and labor without altering conclusions. We
have assumed home bias in preferences, but no non-tradable goods or trade costs, yet our
results immediately extend to these more general economies.13 Similarly, we have adopted a
money-in-the-utility framework where real money balances are separable from consumption
and leisure, but all results are unchanged when money is introduced via a cash-in-advance
constraint.
Government policy instruments We formulate our model using money supply as the
instrument of monetary policy (money supply rule) in both countries. We could alterna-
tively have performed our analysis using interest rate rules or exchange rate rules without
any alterations to our equivalence results.14 As in the New Keynesian literature, in our
environment, the nominal interest rate is the only money market variable relevant for the
rest of the allocation. Consequently, we could also focus on the cashless limit, to which our
equivalence results also apply. We further discuss some of these issue in Section 4.1. For
simplicity, we start from a situation where initial taxes are zero and characterize the required
changes in taxes, but all the results generalize to a situation where initial taxes are not zero
(see footnote 23).
13Note that non-tradable goods are equivalent in our analysis to domestic goods produced for domestic
market, and require no special treatment in the design of a ﬁscal devaluation.
14See Benigno, Benigno, and Ghironi (2007) for the design of an interest rate rule to maintain a ﬁxed
exchange rate.
12Price setting frictions Our results generalize to departures from Calvo price and wage
setting. Any model of time-contingent price adjustment with arbitrary heterogeneity in price
adjustment hazard rates would deliver similar results. It can also be generalized to a menu
cost model in which the menu cost is given in real units, e.g. in labor, as is commonly assumed,
since in this case the decision to adjust prices will depend only on real variables (including
relative prices) which stay unchanged across nominal and ﬁscal devaluations. Furthermore,
our equivalence results also apply in other environments where devaluations have real eﬀects
without nominal frictions, as for example in the neoclassical model of Feenstra (1985) with
cash-in-advance constraints in home and foreign currency.15 In Section 4.3 we discuss further
extensions to our price-setting assumptions.
3 Fiscal Devaluations
In this section we formally deﬁne the concept of a ﬁscal devaluation and present our main
results on the equivalence between nominal and ﬁscal devaluations, ﬁrst for complete and
then for incomplete asset markets, as well as for the special case of a one-time unanticipated
devaluation. We complete the section with the discussion of government revenue neutrality
of ﬁscal devaluations.
Deﬁnition Consider an equilibrium path of the model economy described above, along
which the nominal exchange rate follows
Et = E0(1 + t) for t  0;
for some (stochastic) sequence ftgt0. Here t denotes the percent nominal devaluation of
the home currency relative to period 0. We refer to such an equilibrium path as a nominal
ftg-devaluation. Denote by fMtg the path of home money supply that is associated with the
nominal devaluation. A ﬁscal ftg-devaluation is a sequence fM0
t;m
t ;&x
t ;v
t ;&
p
t ;&c
t;n
t ;d
t gt0
of money supply and taxes that achieves the same equilibrium allocation of consumption,
output and labor supply, but for which the equilibrium exchange rate is ﬁxed, E0
t  E0 for
all t  0. Note that, in general, we do not restrict the path of the exchange rate under a
nominal devaluation.16
Before formulating and proving our main results, we manipulate the two equilibrium
conditions which play the central role in our analysis. First, we divide the home country
15In this environment Feenstra (1985) studied how the tariﬀ policy could improve over a nominal
devaluation.
16For example, one can examine simple one-time devaluations with t = 0 for t < T and t =  for t  T
with some stochastic or deterministic T  0.
13budget constraint (22) by P 
t Et to obtain:
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where q
j
t = Q
j
t=(P 
t Et) and d
j
t = D
j
t=(P 
t Et) are real prices and payouts of assets in units of
the foreign ﬁnal good; and
St 
PFt
P 
Ht
1
Et
1   v
t
1 + m
t
(24)
is the home’s terms of trade—the ratio of the import price index to the export price index
adjusted for border taxes. Second, we rewrite the international risk sharing conditions (7)
using the deﬁnitions of the home and foreign stochastic discount factors (3) and (6):
Et
(
q
j
t+1 + d
j
t+1
q
j
t
"
Ct+1
Ct
  Qt+1
Qt
 

C
t+1
C
t
 #)
= 0 8j 2 
t; (25)
where
Qt 
P 
t Et
Pt=(1 + &c
t)
(26)
is the consumer-price real exchange rate.
These conditions highlight the role of the two international relative prices—the terms
of trade St in shaping the trade balance on the right-hand side of the country budget con-
straint (23) and the real exchange rate Qt in the international risk sharing condition (25).
The exact roles of these two relative prices changes as we consider diﬀerent asset market
structures. But a ﬁscal devaluation will, in general, need to mimic the behavior of these two
relative prices to replicate the equilibrium allocation resulting from a nominal devaluation.
3.1 Complete asset markets
In this case we assume that countries have access to a full set of one-period Arrow securities
and there is perfect risk sharing across countries.
Proposition 1 Under complete international asset markets, and for both producer and local
currency pricing, a ﬁscal ftg-devaluation can be achieved by one of the two policies:

m
t = &
x
t = &
c
t = 
n
t = 
d
t = t; or (FD0)

v
t = &
p
t =
t
1 + t
; &
c
t = 
n
t = t and 
d
t = 0; (FD00)
as well as a suitable choice of fM0
tg, for t  0.
14The formal proof, contained in Appendix A.1, demonstrates that both ﬁscal devaluation
options fE0
t;m
t ;&x
t ;v
t ;&
p
t ;&c
t;n
t ;d
t g and a nominal devaluation fEt;0g satisfy the equilibrium
system under the same allocation of output, consumption and labor supply. This means
that taxes in both the tariﬀ-based (FD0) and VAT-based (FD00) policies aﬀect the equilibrium
conditions exactly in the same way as changes in the exchange rate, and in particular, cancel
each other out from the equilibrium conditions not directly aﬀected by the exchange rate.
The reason the combinations of taxes in (FD0) and (FD00) support a ﬁscal devaluation is
that they ensure that all reset prices and wages remain the same, and given unchanged prices
the rest of the allocation also remains unchanged. Indeed, to leave the wage setting in (19)
unchanged requires the parity between the labor income tax and the consumption subsidy
(n
t = &c
t), a policy change that keeps the labor wedge unaltered. Analogously, domestic
price setting in (13) requires the parity between the VAT and the payroll subsidy (v
t = &
p
t ).
Now consider international price setting, where the VAT or the border taxes need to mimic
the eﬀects of an exchange rate movement on both export and import prices:
1 + &x
t
1   v
t
=
1 + m
t
1   v
t
=
Et
E0
= 1 + t: (27)
Indeed, tax policies satisfying (27) result in the same international prices under both PCP
(see (12) and (16)) and LCP (see (15) and (17)). The taxes described so far are suﬃcient to
replicate the path of all nominal prices and wages, as well as the terms of trade in (24), but
not the real exchange rate in (26), which additionally requires the use of the consumption
subsidy, &c
t = t. This summarizes the logic behind the policies in (FD0) and (FD00).17
Under complete markets, the international risk sharing condition (25) becomes the fa-
miliar Backus-Smith condition: 
Ct
C
t

= Qt; (28)
which ties the relative consumptions of the two countries to the real exchange rate, and
where the constant  is recovered from the intertemporal budget constraint of the country,
which depends on relative prices and in particular the evolution of the terms of trade (see
Appendix A.1). This implies that the consumption allocation also remains unchanged under
(FD0) and (FD00) relative to a nominal devaluation, given that, as we established, these
policies leave unchanged all prices, including the terms of trade and the real exchange rate.
And once we have established that fCt;C
t g follows the same path, consumptions and outputs
of every variety, as well as labor demand and supply, must also follow the same path to satisfy
good and labor demand conditions given unchanged wages and prices.
17Under complete markets, the use of the proﬁt tax d
t is merely needed to avoid second-order distortions
in price setting under the tariﬀ-based policy (FD0).
15For a more intuitive narrative, let us consider a particular price setting environment,
namely PCP. In this case an exchange rate devaluation at home depreciates home’s terms
of trade. As home’s import price rises relative to its export price, there is an expenditure
switching eﬀect that reallocates home and foreign demand towards home goods. This is the
standard channel through which exchange rate depreciations have expansionary eﬀects on
the economy. A ﬁscal devaluation mimics the same movement in the terms of trade (24),
which under PCP we rewrite using the law of one price conditions (12) and (16) as:
St =
P 
Ft
PHt
Et
1 + &x
t
1   v
t
;
Given the producer currency prices PHt and P 
Ft, a ﬁscal devaluation requires either v
t =
t=(1 + t) or &x
t = m
t = t. That is, an exchange rate depreciation given producer prices
raises the relative price of home imports to home exports. A ﬁscal devaluation generates the
same relative price adjustment by means of either an increase in VAT or imposition of an
import tariﬀ and export subsidy. The VAT aﬀects international relative prices because it is
both reimbursed to home exporters and imposed at the border on home importers of foreign
goods, and hence no additional border tax (import tariﬀ or export subsidy) is required when
the VAT is used. An increased VAT must be coupled with a payroll subsidy &
p
t = v
t in
order to avoid a negative wedge in the home price setting and good supply, absent under a
nominal devaluation.
The use of the consumption subsidy &c
t is important for replicating the behavior of the real
exchange rate, which depreciates under a nominal devaluation with sticky prices. Indeed,
without the use of the consumption subsidy, both the import tariﬀ and the VAT policies,
despite mimicking the terms of trade movement, raise the home price level by making foreign
goods more expansive. This results in an appreciated real exchange rate which needs to be
undone by the consumption subsidy. The use of the consumption subsidy however distorts
the wage setting and labor supply decision, which needs to be oﬀset using a proportional
labor income tax, n
t = &c
t = t. In the presence of international risk sharing, the movement
in the real exchange rate matters for the relative consumption allocation across countries,
and consequently the consumption subsidy is essential. However, there are two cases when
mimicking the real exchange rate, and hence using the consumption subsidy and income tax,
is not essential for the equivalence. The ﬁrst is the case of ﬁnancial autarky and balanced
trade which we discuss in Appendix A.2; the second is the case of incomplete international
asset markets under an unanticipated devaluation which we study in detail in Section 3.3.
Discussion We now highlight some interesting features about our equivalence result. First,
a surprising ﬁnding is that the same policies work under both LCP and PCP, independently
16of whether the law of one price holds. This is because the policies replicate not only the
terms of trade, but also the deviations from the law of one price, whenever they exist under
LCP, and all relative prices more generally. Note however that despite the equivalence result
holding independently of pricing assumptions, the allocations under LCP and PCP can be
substantially diﬀerent (as discussed, for example, in Lane, 2001). In particular, under PCP
the terms of trade depreciates with a devaluation, while under LCP it appreciates on impact
(see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000).
Secondly, ﬁscal devaluations mimic not only real variables and relative prices, but also
nominal prices. This is because under the staggered price setting environment replicating
the path of nominal prices is essential in order not to distort relative prices, and hence
relative output, across ﬁrms that do and do not adjust prices. As a consequence, since ﬁscal
devaluations mimic all nominal prices, the standard redistribution concerns associated with
inﬂation are identical across ﬁscal and nominal devaluations.
Third, the ﬁscal devaluation policies depend only on ftg, the desired devaluation se-
quence, and not directly on the details of the model economy. In this sense, ﬁscal devaluation
policies are robust—they are insensitive to the micro structure of the economy and require
little information about it. The optimal size of the devaluation, however, depends on model
details.
Finally, we emphasize that a ﬁscal devaluation requires no active adjustment to money
supply, and the path of home money supply is determined endogenously by equilibrium
money demand in (5) given the decision of the home central bank to implement a particular
path of the exchange rate under respectively a nominal and a ﬁscal devaluation.18 We return
to the discussion of monetary policy rules sustaining a ﬁscal devaluation in Section 4.1.
3.2 Incomplete asset markets
We now consider the case of incomplete asset markets. The equivalence result follows closely
that of Proposition 1 under complete markets, and in general terms can be stated as follows:
Lemma 1 Under arbitrary asset markets, both (FD0) and (FD00) constitute ftg-ﬁscal de-
valuation policies as long as the foreign-currency payoﬀs of all internationally-traded assets
fD
j
t g are unchanged.
18The path of the money supply under a ﬁscal devaluation is, in general, diﬀerent from that under a
nominal devaluation, which however is not consequential for the rest of the allocation when money enters
the utility function separably. Under the alternative assumption, or if we additionally required to replicate
the path of the real money holdings, the equivalence requires the use of an additional tax on money holdings
to mimic the reduced money demand under an expected nominal devaluation (see Appendix A.1).
17Proof: As we show in the proof of Proposition 1, (FD0) and (FD00) replicate changes in all
relative prices including the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. The same arguments
go through in the case of incomplete markets as the relevant equilibrium conditions are the
same. The main diﬀerence with the complete markets case is that now the general versions of
the country budget constraint and international risk sharing conditions (23) and (25) apply.
As long as real asset payoﬀs and prices fd
j
t ;q
j
t g are unchanged in terms of the foreign ﬁnal
good, conditions (23) and (25) are satisﬁed under the original allocation fCt;C
t g and the
original asset demand fB
j
tg. Since under these policies fP 
t g is unchanged, it is enough to
require that fD
j
t ;Q
j
t g are unchanged where D
j
t = d
j
t P 
t is the foreign-currency nominal
payoﬀ of an asset. Finally, the fundamental price of the asset satisﬁes
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t;sD
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s
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;
hence under no-bubble asset pricing we only need to require that the path of foreign-currency
nominal asset payoﬀs fD
j
t g is unchanged. 
Our equivalence results therefore apply to settings with arbitrarily rich, albeit incomplete,
ﬁnancial markets. Solving for international portfolio choice under these settings is notori-
ously complicated (e.g., see discussion in Devereux and Sutherland, 2008). Nevertheless,
our analysis goes through as we do not need to characterize the solution, but merely verify
whether an allocation that is an equilibrium outcome under one set of policies remains an
equilibrium allocation under another set of policies.
We next can consider a variety of asset market structures in view of Lemma 1. First
consider one-period risk-free foreign-currency nominal bond. This bond pays D
f
t+1  1 in
foreign currency and its foreign-currency price is Q
f
t = Et


t+1
	
= 1=(1+i
t+1), where i
t+1
is the foreign-currency risk-free nominal interest rate. This asset satisﬁes requirements in
Lemma 1, and hence (FD0) and (FD00) constitute ﬁscal devaluation policies without additional
instruments. The same applies to long-term foreign-currency debt as well.
Next consider one-period home-currency risk-free bond with a payoﬀ of Dh
t+1 = 1 in
home currency, and hence Dh
t+1 = 1=Et+1 in foreign-currency. This asset does not satisfy
Lemma 1, and hence we need to introduce partial default (haircut h
t ) to make its foreign-
currency payoﬀ the same as under a nominal devaluation. A haircut policy on one-period
home-currency debt that is required for equivalence satisﬁes:
1   
h
t+1 
Et
Et+1
, 
h
t+1 =
t+1   t
1 + t+1
; (29)
18i.e., the haircut at t + 1 equals the incremental percent devaluation in that period. With
this haircut, the equilibrium payoﬀ of the home-currency debt under a ﬁscal devaluation is
D
h
t+1 = 1   
h
t+1 =
1 + t
1 + t+1
;
and hence its foreign-currency price becomes
Q
h
t = Et



t+1(1   
h
t+1)
	
= (1 + t)Et



t+1=(1 + t+1)
	
:
This haircut keeps the returns on the bond (Dh
t+1=Qh
t ) unchanged in the foreign currency
across nominal and ﬁscal devaluations, which is suﬃcient to ensure the rest of the equivalence.
Note that the partial default in (29) exactly replicates the valuation eﬀects on home-currency
assets associated with exchange rate movements (e.g., see Gourinchas and Rey, 2007).19
As the last example, we consider international trade in equities, for which:20
D
he
t =
t
(1 + d
t )Et
and D
fe
t = 

t:
From equations (10) for proﬁts and its foreign counterpart, we observe that both (FD0) and
(FD00) keep both t=[(1 + d
t )Et] and 
t unchanged relative to a nominal devaluation, and
hence the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisﬁed without additional instruments. Indeed, the
VAT-cum-payroll subsidy under (FD00) reduces the foreign-currency proﬁts of home ﬁrms,
just like a nominal devaluation. Similarly, the proﬁt (dividend-income) tax does the same
under a tariﬀ-based devaluation (FD0). This, in particular, replicates the distributional and
balance-sheet eﬀects of a nominal devaluation.
We summarize the results above in:
Proposition 2 Under trade in foreign-currency risk-free bonds and international trade in
equities, a ﬁscal ftg-devaluation can be achieved by the same polices (FD0) and (FD00) as
under complete markets; with trade in home-currency bonds, (FD0) and (FD00) need to be
complemented with a partial default (haircut) equal to h
t = (t   t 1)=(1 + t) on all out-
standing home-currency debt.
19Under a representative agent economy, it is suﬃcient to require a partial default (haircut) only on
all internationally held home-currency bonds; in a heterogeneous-agent economy exact equivalence requires
partial default on all outstanding home-currency debt, including the within-country holdings across agents,
otherwise ﬁscal devaluations will introduce additional distributions eﬀects beyond those under a nominal
devaluation. Further note that for long-term home-currency debt, the partial default should also extend to
the principal of the debt outstanding.
20The value of the equities are given by Qhe
t =
P
st Et
n

t;s
s
(1+d
t )Et
o
and Q
fe
t =
P
st Etf
t;s
sg.
19Full policies (FD0) and (FD00) robustly engineer ﬁscal devaluations under both complete
and incomplete markets.21 We next study one special case under which the set of policy
instruments needed to implement a ﬁscal devaluation can be substantially reduced.
3.3 One-time unanticipated devaluation
Consider the case of a one-time unanticipated -devaluation at t = 0. Under these circum-
stances, prior to t = 0, the devaluation is completely unexpected (i.e., a zero probability
event), while at t = 0 the exchange rate devalues by  once and for all future periods and
states. As we now show, a ﬁscal devaluation under these circumstances imposes a substan-
tially weaker requirement on the set of ﬁscal instruments—in particular, the consumption
subsidy and the income tax can be dispensed with—as long as asset markets are incomplete
in the sense that they do not allow for international transfers targeted speciﬁcally to the
zero-probability event of an unanticipated devaluation.
Proposition 3 Under incomplete markets, a one-time unanticipated ﬁscal -devaluation
may be attained with one of the two reduced policies:

m
t = &
x
t = 
d
t =  and &
c
t = 
n
t = 0; or (FD0
R)

v
t = &
p
t =

1 + 
and &
c
t = 
n
t = 
d
t = 0; (FD00
R)
coupled with a partial default (haircut) h
0 = =(1 + ) on home-currency debt and an un-
changed path of money supply M0
t = Mt, for t  0.
See Appendix A.3 for the formal proof of this proposition. The main diﬀerence of the
reduced policies (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) from the full policies in Propositions 1 and 2, is that
the consumption subsidy and income tax can be dispensed with. This is because under
an unanticipated devaluation we have one less relative price to replicate and that is the
real exchange rate. Note that international risk sharing (25) is unaﬀected by a one-time
unanticipated jump in the real exchange rate in the event of a devaluation, provided that
international asset markets are incomplete. As a result, only the path of the terms of trade,
but not of the real exchange rate, has to be mimicked in this case.
Intuitively, the terms of trade is the relative price aﬀecting the terms of exchange in a
given state, as reﬂected in the ﬂow budget constraint (23). In contrast, the real exchange rate
is the relative price aﬀecting savings (trade across time) and portfolio choice (risk-sharing
21As Benigno and Kucuk-Tuger (2012) highlight, the real allocations are very sensitive to small changes
in the number of assets traded. Despite this, the ﬁscal equivalence propositions remain the same across
arbitrary degrees of asset market completeness.
20across states of the world), as reﬂected in (25). Since the devaluation is unanticipated,
savings and portfolio choice decisions are unaﬀected prior to the devaluation (for t < 0).
Furthermore, as it is a one-time permanent devaluation, after it happens at t = 0 the
future dynamics of the real exchange rate, Qt+1=Qt for t  0, remains the same under a
reduced ﬁscal devaluation as under a nominal devaluation. Consequently, the savings and
portfolio choice decisions are also unaﬀected for t  0, and the jump in Qt at t = 0 remains
inconsequential for the equilibrium allocation. This is why the consumption subsidy can be
dispensed with, and by consequence the income tax is also not needed since there is no labor
supply wedge to oﬀset.22
Implementability Arguably, the reduced VAT-based policy (FD00
R) under a one-time
unanticipated devaluation is the most practical from a policy perspective. Indeed, it re-
quires only a one-time change in two widely used tax rates—an increase in the value-added
tax and a reduction in the payroll tax. The requirement, however, is that these tax changes
are equally unanticipated, and in Section 5 we study numerically the departures from equiv-
alence when the ﬁscal adjustment happens with a lag.
It might appear that while the size of a nominal devaluation is unrestricted with  2
(0;+1), even in theory the size of the tax adjustment is limited as it cannot exceed 100%.
This is actually not the case. Theoretically a ﬁscal devaluation of arbitrary size   0 is
also possible. For example, under (FD00
R), a -devaluation requires setting VAT and payroll
subsidy at =(1 + ) 2 (0;1).23 We further consider the issue of the plausible magnitude of
a ﬁscal devaluation in Section 5.
3.4 Government revenue neutrality
We now study how ﬁscal devaluations aﬀect government revenues over and above the eﬀects
of a nominal devaluation. We ﬁrst show that the full ﬁscal devaluation policies (FD0) and
(FD00) are exactly revenue neutral, state-by-state and period-by-period, that is lead to exactly
the same eﬀects on the government budget as a nominal devaluation. We then analyze the
22Note that consumption subsidy and income tax do not aﬀect the country budget constraint (23) directly,
but they do lead to distributional consequences between the home government and the home households, as
we discuss in Section 3.4 (cf. parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4).
23If there were initial non-zero VAT and payroll taxes in place, one can verify that the required new taxes
under a ﬁscal -devaluation are:
v =
 v + 
1 + 
and p =
 p   
1 + 
;
where  v and  p are the pre-devaluation levels of VAT and payroll taxes. Note that for any size of devalua-
tion , we still have v < 1 and &p   p < 1. The larger is the initial level of VAT, the smaller is a required
further increase in the VAT to achieve a given level of devaluation.
21one-time unanticipated policies (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) which do not utilize consumption and
income taxes, and show that these policies generate additional tax revenues in periods (and
states of the world) when the country runs trade deﬁcits.
It is convenient to introduce the following notation:

m
t = &
x
t = 
d
t = 
m
t ; 
v
t = &
p
t =
v
t
1 + v
t
; &
c
t = 
n
t = t:
Under (FD0), m
t = t = t and v
t = 0; under (FD00), m
t = 0 and v
t = t = t. The
one-time policies, (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) diﬀer only in that t = 0 and t   for t  0. With
this notation, we can rewrite incremental government tax revenues (21) generated from ﬁscal
devaluations as:24
TRt =

v
t
1 + v
t
+
m
t
1 + m
t
 
t
1 + t

PtCt   WtNt

; (30)
Given this, we prove:
Proposition 4 (i) The full ﬁscal devaluation policies, (FD0) and (FD00), are exactly gov-
ernment revenue neutral state-by-state and in every time period. (ii) Under reduced ﬁscal
devaluation policies, (FD0
R) and (FD00
R), additional government revenues over and above that
from a one-time unanticipated nominal devaluation equal
TRt =  
t
1 + t
NXt +
tt
1 + d
t
; (31)
where NXt = (1 + t)E0P 
HtC
Ht   PFtCFt is the trade balance of the country.
The formal prove of this proposition is contained in Appendix A.4. The ﬁrst part of the
proposition follows immediately from (30) when we substitute in the full ﬁscal devaluation
policies (FD0) or (FD00) which results in TRt  0. The more involved case is when the
reduced policies (FD0
R) or (FD00
R) are used, which when substituted into (30) result in TRt =
=(1 + )  (PtCt   WtNt). This suggests that the additional government revenues from a
reduced ﬁscal devaluation are proportional to the diﬀerence between total consumption and
total production expenditure (equal in our case to the wage bill). The former exceeds the
latter when either the country runs a trade deﬁcit or earns aggregate proﬁts, as formally
reﬂected in (31).25 To summarize, a one-time unanticipated ﬁscal devaluation policy will
generate additional ﬁscal revenues in the periods in which the country runs a trade deﬁcit,
24We used the fact that PHtCHt + PFtCFt = PtCt, as well as the expression for ﬁrm proﬁts (10).
25Indeed, the VAT-cum-payroll subsidy taxes all goods supplied for consumption in the domestic market
(PtCt) and subsidizes production expenditure (WtNt). The tariﬀ-cum-export-subsidy is a tax on net imports
( NXt), while the additional dividend tax under this policy taxes proﬁts (t). As Proposition 4 shows, the
two policies lead to the same government revenues.
22as long as aggregate proﬁts in the economy are non-negative. This is an appealing feature
of this policy from a practical point of view.26
4 Extensions
In this section we discuss four extensions to the benchmark environment discussed in previous
sections. First, we describe how to engineer a ﬁscal devaluation in a currency union. Second,
we allow for capital as a variable input in production besides labor. Third, we discuss our
tax pass-through assumptions and evaluate the case of asymmetric pass-through of VAT and
payroll taxes into prices. Fourth, we allow for labor mobility.
4.1 Fiscal devaluations in a currency union
We now consider the implementation of a ﬁscal devaluation in a monetary union, where the
member-countries give up their monetary policy independence and adopt a common currency
hence abandoning the possibility of a nominal devaluation.27 We consider a general multi-
country world economy in which a subset of countries forms a currency union, while the
remaining countries maintain their own currencies and independent monetary policy.
In general, as we discussed above, a nominal devaluation requires a change in the home
money supply. The distinctive feature of a currency union is that the money supply to
individual member-countries becomes an endogenous variable, and the relative money supply
between the countries adjust in order to satisfy the ﬁxed nominal value of the currency within
the union. The union-wide central bank controls only the overall money supply to all country
members, or alternatively a union-wide nominal interest rate. The questions we ask in this
section are whether the same policies we studied before still constitute a ﬁscal devaluation
and whether a coordinated policy action from the union central bank is required.
To summarize our ﬁndings up front, the same ﬁscal devaluation policies proposed earlier
are still eﬀective in a currency union. Furthermore, in a cashless world in which monetary
authorities follow interest rate rules, any member of a currency union can implement a ﬁscal
devaluation unilaterally without coordination from the union central bank. However, more
generally, away from the cashless limit, a ﬁscal devaluation by a member of a currency union
needs to be accommodated by an increase in money supply by the union central bank (au-
tomatic under an interest-rate rule) and a corresponding transfer of the extra seigniorage
26This also implies, as we show in Appendix A.4, that the net present value of additional ﬁscal surpluses
from an unanticipated ﬁscal devaluation is non-negative when the value of the country’s business sector
(stock market capitalization plus the value of unincorporated business) exceeds its net foreign liabilities,
which is easily satisﬁed for the majority of developed countries.
27For a recent survey of the literature on currency unions see Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
23revenues from the union central bank to the country-member implementing a ﬁscal devalua-
tion. In Section 5 we show in a calibrated model that the eﬀects of these seigniorage transfers
are negligible, and the unilateral ﬁscal policy comes very close to replicating a devaluation.
In the case of multiple countries, two clariﬁcations need to be made. First, the equivalence
now refers to the following two counterfactual scenarios: in one, a country is a member of
a larger currency union and implements a ﬁscal devaluation; and in the other, the country
is not part of the union (e.g., leaves the union) and implements a nominal devaluation
against the currency of the union, while all other members of the union remain a part of
it.28 Second, the equivalence result allows for arbitrary monetary policy rules in countries
outside the currency union. In particular, the equivalence extends to the equilibrium path in
countries outside the currency union and among other variables holds for nominal exchange
rates of these countries against the currency union.29
We now provide the formal extension of the model environment to the case of multiple
countries and the generalization of the ﬁscal devaluation results.
Setup and additional notation Consider a world consisting of NU + NF + 1 countries
which we denote by k 2 f0;:::;NU + NFg  W, where NU  1 and NF  1. We denote
by E
k;k0
t a bilateral nominal exchange rate between countries k;k0 2 W in units of currency
k for one unit of currency k0. NU countries form a currency union U = f1;:::;NUg and
hence have E
k;k0
t  1 for all k;k0 2 U. We denote the exchange rate between the union
currency and a country k 2 WnU outside the currency union by E
U;k
t . NF countries, k 2
fNU +1;:::;NU +NFg  F, follow independent monetary policies (money supply or interest
rate rules) and hence have ﬂoating currencies. The remaining country, k = 0, chooses
between two regimes. First, it may choose to manage its exchange rate against the currency
union, E
0;U
t , in particular carry out a dynamic devaluation t = E
0;U
t , where we normalize
for simplicity E
0;U
0 = 1. Second, it may choose to be part of the currency union (hence have
E
0;U
t  1) and carry out a ﬁscal t-devaluation. We denote by ~ U  U [ f0g the extended
currency union in this case, and ~ U = U in the alternative case when country 0 has an
independent monetary policy.
In terms of notation relative to Section 2, we now use country index k 2 W on all
28The alternative scenario is when all countries leave the union, which we do not consider here since it
results in a large number of possible counterfactual equilibrium pathes depending on the monetary policy
adopted by each country leaving the currency union.
29Pinning down the speciﬁc equilibrium path of the nominal exchange rates between the currency union
and the outside countries requires details of the micro environment and the policy rules used, which we do
not need for our equivalence result. The union central bank can always target its average nominal exchange
rate with a given set of trade partners (or a single trade partner), in which case a ﬁscal devaluation by a
member of the currency union results in an equivalent devaluation against this set of trade partners.
24country-speciﬁc variables (previously we had no identiﬁer for home and star for foreign). We
only need to generalize the expression for the consumption of the imported goods, which
now becomes an index:
C
k
Ft =
2
4
X
k02Wnfkg

1=
k;k0
 
C
k;k0
F;t
 1 

3
5

1 
;
X
k02Wnfkg
k;k0 = 1;
where  is the elasticity of substitution between foreign varieties of the good, which in
general can be diﬀerent from both  and . Each of the C
k;k0
F;t is a CES aggregator of
individual country-k0 varieties with elasticity of substitution , a natural generalization to
the two-country setup. The price indexes P k
F;t are generalized appropriately.
The remaining equilibrium conditions are largely unchanged, in particular, this concerns
the consumer and country budget constraints, risk sharing conditions, money demand, price
and wage setting, as well as the expressions for the terms of trade and the CPI-based real
exchange rate. Each country has a stochastic discount factor k
t;s, and now the risk sharing
conditions (7) must be satisﬁed for each pair of countries and for each internationally traded
asset.
What is diﬀerent now, is the role of the union central bank that provides money supply
MU
t to satisfy money demands Mk
t in the member-countries:
M
U
t =
X
k2~ U
M
k
t :
The central bank collects seigniorage revenues from money supply and redistributes it back
to the member-countries:
M
U
t   M
U
t 1 =
X
k2~ U


k
t;
where 
k
t is the transfer to country k.
Consequently, the government budget constraint of country k 2 ~ U instead of (20) becomes


k
t + TR
k
t = T
k
t ;
where TRk
t  0 when the country does not attempt a ﬁscal devaluation. That is, when
part of a currency union, the revenues of the government from seigniorage under an in-
dependent monetary policy are replaced with the transfers of a share in the union-wide
seigniorage revenues. The government budget constraint for countries outside the currency
union stays unchanged. We assume that these countries follow independent monetary policy
rules—formulated in terms of money supply, interest rate or exchange rate—which can be
conditioned on any variable, nominal or real, with the exception of the bilateral nominal
25exchange rate with country 0, which is not well-deﬁned when it is part of a currency union.
The rules can, however, condition on the exchange rate with the currency union.
Fiscal devaluations in a currency union Consider an equilibrium in this economy,
when country 0 is not part of the currency union. In this case, we have an equilibrium
path for exchange rates fE
U;k
t ;E
0;k
t gk2F and E
0;U
t = t (with initial normalization E
0;U
0 =
0 = 1), which satisfy the no arbitrage relation, E
0;k
t = t  E
U;k
t . Therefore, a nominal ftg-
devaluation against the currency union results in a devaluation of size t  E
U;k
t =E
U;k
0 against
country k, which depends on the movement of union–country-k exchange rate, E
U;k
t =E
U;k
0 .
This equilibrium path is associated with an allocation fCk
t ;Y k
t ;Nk
t gk2W supported by prices,
asset values and money.
We now deﬁne a ﬁscal devaluation by country 0 when it is a part of the currency union
and hence E
U;0
t  1. In this case, a ﬁscal devaluation policy involves the same set of ﬁscal
instruments as in Section 3 used by country 0, as well as the money supply and seigniorage
transfers by the union central bank, fMU0
t ;
k0
t gt0;k2~ U, which result in the same equilibrium
path fCk
t ;Y k
t ;Nk
t gk2W as a nominal ftg-devaluation against the currency union. We prove
the following generalization:
Proposition 5 The ﬁscal devaluation policies in Propositions 1–3 still constitute a ﬁscal
ftg-devaluation in a currency union, provided that the union central bank follows
M
U0
t = M
00
t +
X
k2U
M
k
t and 

00
t = M
00
t ;
where M00
t is the money supply under a ﬁscal devaluation, as in Propositions 1–3 respectively.
Money supply in all other countries (Mk
t , k 2 Wnf0g) and seigniorage transfers to the other
members of the currency union (
k
t, k 2 U) are the same as under the nominal devaluation.
We omit the proof of this proposition for brevity, as it follows the same steps as the proof
of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 by noting that the country budget constraints (23) and
international risk sharing conditions (25) generalize directly to the multi-country case, as
well as the country’s terms of trade (24) and real exchange rate (26).30 Note that the
ﬁscal devaluation policy must aﬀect international transactions symmetrically vis-à-vis all
trade partners of the country, both inside and outside the currency union. For example,
an increase in the VAT needs to be applied to all imports (reimbursed on all exporters)
independently of the country of origin (destination).
30The additional requirement of Lemma 1 that the payoﬀs of all assets remain the same in the foreign
currency is now modiﬁed to allow for any country’s currency foreign to the devaluing country. Therefore,
under incomplete markets, debt in any currency other than country 0 does not require additional instruments,
while debt in home currency of country 0 still requires a partial default.
26The distinctive feature of a ﬁscal devaluation in a currency union is that now the union
central bank needs to increase the money supply exactly to accommodate the increase in
money demand in country 0 triggered by the ﬁscal devaluation policy, as well as transfer the
additional seigniorage revenues to country 0. The union central bank does not need to worry
about the distribution of the money supply between the members of the currency union, as
this happens endogenously given the ﬁxed exchange rate (common currency) between the
member-countries.31
The same outcome can be obtained with a union-wide interest rate rule, by setting a
path for iU
t+1. In this case, the equivalence requires no active monetary policy response from
the union central bank, but merely that it follows the same iU
t+1-policy rule as under the
alternative scenario of the nominal devaluation, which endogenously results in the path of
money supply fMU0
t g supporting a ﬁscal devaluation.32 This is, of course, a more practical
case, which also better ﬁts the reality of monetary policy in the world.
The transfer of additional seigniorage revenues is, in general, needed even under an inter-
est rate policy rule, to keep unchanged the budget constraint of the country implementing
a ﬁscal devaluation relative to the alternative scenario of a nominal devaluation. We now
provide a limiting result where the seigniorage transfers are not needed. Speciﬁcally, consider
the limiting case of a cashless economy by letting  ! 0 in the utility function so that the
money demand (5) shrinks to zero independently of consumption and interest rate. In this
case seigniorage revenues are also arbitrary small, and consequently seigniorage transfers
become inessential. We then have:
Proposition 6 Consider a cashless economy ( = 0), in which the union central bank
follows a monetary policy rule resulting in a given equilibrium path of the nominal interest
rate, fiU
t+1g. Then a member-country of the currency union can attain a ﬁscal devaluation
unilaterally without coordination from the union central bank, by means of ﬁscal policies
described in Propositions 1–3.
In Section 5 we study the importance of violating the seigniorage transfer requirement in a
calibrated model with  > 0, and ﬁnd its quantitative importance negligible for the equiv-
31In the case when country 0 is small, in the particular sense that M0
t =MU
t ! 0, the changes in M0
t do not
aﬀect MU
t . Therefore, the union central bank does not need to move MU
t when a small member of the union
implements a ﬁscal devaluation. In this case, given MU
t , the money supply relocates towards the devaluing
member without aﬀecting the rest of the currency union as the devaluing country is small.
32From Lemma 1 we know that the union-currency nominal interest rate follows the same path under
a nominal and a ﬁscal devaluation, which in particular implies that a zero-lower-bound constraint on the
union interest rate policy will be binding to the same extent under a nominal and a ﬁscal devaluation. It is
important for equivalence, however, that the union central bank follows exactly the same policy rule under a
nominal and a ﬁscal devaluation, and does not change its objective or target across the two counterfactuals.
27alence result. This suggests that Proposition 6 provides a relevant point of approximation
for our analysis.33
To summarize, the ﬁscal devaluation policies considered earlier in a two-country world
where both countries preserve their monetary policy independence, extend directly to a much
richer setup with multiple countries a subset of which form a currency union. With these
policies, a country within a currency union can replicate the equilibrium path it could have
attained by being outside the currency union and devaluing against the currency of the union.
Finally, under the circumstances likely to be relevant empirically, a ﬁscal devaluation inside
a currency union can be implemented unilaterally by any country-member of the currency
union without coordination from the union central bank.
4.2 Capital
In this sub-section, we discuss how our characterization of ﬁscal devaluations change when
we introduce capital into the model as an additional variable input in production. With
capital, additional tax instruments are required to implement a ﬁscal devaluation, and we
introduce these instruments below. In Section 5, we study the performance of an incomplete
ﬁscal devaluation policy without these additional instruments in a calibrated model economy
with capital and adjustment costs.
We adopt a formalization where ﬁrms frictionlessly rent the services of labor and capital
on centralized spot markets, at prices Wt and Rt, and capital is accumulated by households.
The full model setup is described in the online appendix, while here we present the two
central new equilibrium conditions. Given these two conditions, the remaining equilibrium
conditions including price setting, country budget constraint and international risk sharing
conditions are not aﬀected.
The ﬁrst of these conditions is the ﬁrm’s choice of production inputs:
MRTit
 
Nt(i);Kt(i)

=
(1   &R
t )Rt
(1   &
p
t )Wt
;
where MRTit
 
Nt(i);Kt(i)

is the marginal rate of transformation of one unit of capital for
one unit of labor in the production of ﬁrm i, &
p
t is the payroll subsidy as before, and now &R
t
is a capital subsidy (or, a subsidy on the ﬁrm capital rental expenses). Whenever the payroll
subsidy is used (e.g., as in the VAT-payroll subsidy policy (FD00)), it has to be complemented
33Indeed, seigniorage plays a small role as a source of government revenues in most developed countries,
which motives the focus on the cashless limit in a large part of the New Keynesian literature (e.g., see
Woodford, 2003).
28with a uniform capital subsidy:
&
R
t  &
p
t ;
otherwise ﬁrms would have an incentive to substitute labor for capital in production under
a ﬁscal devaluation—an eﬀect absent in a nominal devaluation.
The second new condition is household optimality with respect to capital accumulation:
Et

Ct+1
Ct
  Pt=(1 + &c
t)
Pt+1=(1 + &c
t+1)
(1 + &
I
t )

Rt+1
1 + K
t+1
+
1   d
1 + &I
t+1

= 1;
where d is the capital depreciation rate, &c
t is the consumption subsidy as before, and now &I
t
is the investment subsidy (investment tax credit) and K
t is the capital-income tax. The
condition above states that the return on an additional unit of physical capital discounted
with the home stochastic discount factor equals one, where for simplicity we assumed no
adjustment costs which we introduce in Section 5.
As can be seen from this optimality condition, a ﬁscal devaluation policy requires

K
t  &
I
t  &
c
t;
i.e., a capital-income tax and an investment subsidy both equal to the consumption subsidy
involved. If the investment subsidy is not used together with the consumption subsidy, a ﬁscal
devaluation distorts the household’s allocation of expenditure in favor of consumption goods
and away from investment goods since the relative price of the investment good increases. If
the capital-income tax is not used together with the consumption subsidy, a ﬁscal devaluation
distorts the consumption-savings decision in favor of greater capital accumulation due to
increased after-tax returns on capital. Importantly, whenever the consumption subsidy is
not used as part of a ﬁscal devaluation policy, the capital-income tax and the investment
subsidy will not be used as well. We summarize these results in:
Proposition 7 In an economy with capital as a variable input in production, (i) full ﬁscal
devaluation policies (FD0) and (FD00) of Propositions 1–2 need to be extended with a capital-
income tax and investment subsidy, K
t  &I
t  t, while K
t  &I
t  0 under reduced
ﬁscal devaluation policies (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) of Proposition 3; (ii) in addition, VAT-based
ﬁscal devaluation policies (FD00) and (FD00
R) need to be complemented with a capital subsidy,
&R
t  t=(1 + t), while tariﬀ-based policies (FD0) and (FD0
R) need not.
If we focus on the reduced VAT-based ﬁscal devaluation (FD00
R) as the most practical policy,
the only additional tax instrument required is the capital subsidy to ﬁrms. The general
principle is that all value added inputs of the ﬁrm need to be subsidized at the same rate in
order not to distort the equilibrium mix of the factors of production.
294.3 Tax pass-through
We now turn to the discussion of our assumptions on the sensitivity of prices to exchange
rate and tax changes, relate it to existing empirical evidence and analytically evaluate a
departure from the pass-through assumptions in the main text. For concreteness, we restrict
attention to the VAT-based reduced ﬁscal devaluation policy (FD00
R) replicating a one-time
unanticipated devaluation (Proposition 3), due to its greater implementability. The propo-
sitions on equivalence rely on two sets of assumptions that would be normal to impose in a
standard new Keynesian environment: One, foreign ﬁrms pass-through of exchange rate and
VAT changes into the prices at which they sell to the domestic market is the same, all else
equal, that is conditional on the foreign wage. Two, domestic ﬁrms pass-through of VAT
and payroll tax to domestic prices is the same, conditional on the domestic wage.
In the medium and long-run, when ﬁrms adjust their prices, these assumptions are nat-
ural. When the exchange rate and tax changes are large, the long-run can be attained very
quickly since ﬁrms will choose to adjust prices immediately. The question then is about the
short-run, when as a large body of evidence suggests, prices adjust infrequently and respond
sluggishly to shocks.
We now survey what empirical evidence exists on the short-run response of prices to ex-
change rate and tax policy changes. The ﬁrst assumption requires symmetry of pass-through
of exchange rate shocks and VAT shocks into foreign ﬁrms prices to the domestic market.
Since existing papers in the literature do not directly address this question, one is necessarily
comparing evidence across diﬀerent data sets and more importantly comparing cases where
the tax shocks and exchange rate shocks are not necessarily similarly unanticipated or an-
ticipated. Nevertheless, what evidence exists appears to support the assumption of similar
pass-through rates. For instance, Campa, Goldberg, and González-Mínguez (2005) estimate
that short-run (one month) pass-through into import prices in the Euro Area is 66% (and
81% in the long-run, after four months). Andrade, Carré, and Bénassy-Quéré (2010) exam-
ine data on French exports to the Euro zone over the 1996–2005 period and document that
median pass-through of VAT shocks that occurred in eleven EMU12 partner countries over
this period is 70–82% at a one year horizon. While they lack higher frequency data they
conclude that the evidence is consistent with similar pass-through behavior for exchange rate
and VAT shocks over a year. The evidence also appears consistent with producer currency
pricing.
Evidence on the second assumption on responses of domestic prices to VAT and payroll
is even harder to come by. First, while there exist some studies on VAT pass-through at
various horizons there are very few equivalent studies for payroll taxes. Carbonnier (2007)
30studies two French reforms that involved steep decreases in VAT in 1987 and then in 1999
and ﬁnds that the pass-through into domestic prices, almost immediately, was 57% in the
new car sales market and 77% in the household repair services market. The extent of pass-
through therefore varies by market. There is however no similar evidence for payroll tax
changes in these markets. Further, the tax changes were of a very large magnitude and
consequently more revealing of long-run pass-through.34 The one case study that involved
both a VAT increase and a payroll tax cut is the German VAT increase of 3 percentage
points and a cut in employer and employee payroll contributions by 2.3 percentage points
in 2007. Carare and Danninger (2008) examine the eﬀect of these policy changes on core
inﬂation. They ﬁnd evidence of staggered price adjustment to tax shocks. The tax policies
were announced 13 months ahead of actual implementation and, consistent with infrequent
price adjustment, they ﬁnd that prices adjusted upward prior to implementation. They
conclude that overall pass-through from VAT was 73% with about half of this occurring
in the run-up to implementation and the other half at the time of implementation. This
evidence however cannot be directly used to shed light on the symmetry assumption. Firstly,
they focus on core inﬂation and do not distinguish between domestic and foreign price pass-
through. Secondly, they provide no evidence on pass-through of the payroll tax. Given
that their identiﬁcation relies on comparing VAT-eﬀected goods with non-VAT goods, they
isolate only the VAT pass-through component. This evidence also does not shed light on
unanticipated tax changes.
The existing evidence therefore does not shed much light on the second assumption.
Consequently, we brieﬂy discuss how the equivalence proposition is impacted in the case of
short-run asymmetry in pass-through rates between VAT and payroll tax. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that ﬁrms during the period of price non-adjustment mechanically index their price
changes to changes in VAT and payroll taxes:
PHt(i) =
8
<
:
 PHt(i); if adjust,
PH;t 1(i)

1 v
t
1 v
t 1
 v 
1 &
p
t
1 &
p
t 1
p
; if does not adjust,
(32)
where v;p 2 [0;1] are short-run tax pass-through (index) rates. Our baseline analysis of
Sections 2–3 was performed under the assumption v = p = 0. However, since our policies
always involve a uniform adjustment in VAT and payroll subsidy (v
t = &
p
t ), the baseline
results immediately extend to the case of symmetric short-run pass-through, v = p 2 [0;1].
We now discuss the asymmetric pass-through case, for concreteness specializing to 0 
34In September 1987, the VAT rate on car sales went down from the luxury-rate of 33.3% to the full-rate
of 18.6%. In September 1999, the VAT rate on housing repair services went down from the full-rate of 20.6%
to the reduced-rate of 5.5%
31p < v  1, that is a higher short-run pass-through on VAT changes relative to payroll tax
changes. Under PCP, the law of one price (12) and (16) still holds for international prices,
hence requiring that the VAT adjusts exactly as in Proposition 3, v
t  =(1 + ) for t  0.
Therefore, we need to choose a suitable dynamic path for the payroll subsidy in order to
mimic the behavior of the price index for the home good in the home market, PHt.35 The
online supplement oﬀers a detailed analysis, while here we only provide an expression for the
path of the payroll tax when its short-run pass-through is zero, p = 0:
&
p
0 = 1  

1
1 + 
1+v=
>

1 + 
and &
p
t = 
v
t =

1 + 
for t  1;
where  = (1   p)(1   p)=p is a measure of price stickiness (i.e., the slope parameter of
the New Keynesian Phillips curve; see, e.g., Galí, 2008).
The main insight from this analysis, which generalizes to the case of p 2 (0;v), is that
with a lower pass-through of payroll taxes relative to VAT, a ﬁscal devaluation requires an
overshooting in the payroll subsidy in the short run before it settles at its long-run level equal
to the one-time increase in the VAT. This is intuitive, as the lower pass-through of payroll
subsidies limits their eﬀectiveness to curb the short-run price increase triggered by the spike
in the VAT. In contrast to our results in Section 3, engineering a ﬁscal devaluation under
asymmetric pass-through requires information about the micro structure of the economy, in
particular the short-run pass-through rates p and v, and the measure of price stickiness .
4.4 Labor mobility
Our baseline setup does not allow for labor mobility across countries, however, the analyzed
ﬁscal devaluation policies can be extended to economies with labor mobility. Labor mobility
can be introduced into the model in diﬀerent ways. Consider the case in which the home
workers have the option to be employed in the foreign country, but still have their consump-
tion at home.36 In this case, the no arbitrage condition for workers requires the equalization
of nominal payoﬀs in the two locations, Wt=(1 + n
t ) = EtW 
t . Since as we have discussed,
a ﬁscal devaluation needs to replicate the path of fWt;W 
t g, the use of income tax becomes
essential under labor mobility. Indeed, the full policies (FD0) and (FD00) of Propositions 1
and 2 do satisfy this requirement, and continue to implement ﬁscal devaluation even with
35With asymmetric pass-through, one can only achieve a ﬁrst-order equivalence, mimicking the behavior
of the aggregate price indexes, but not individual ﬁrm prices.
36An alternative case is when workers can only choose to migrate fully, moving the location of both their
employment and consumption. Since ﬁscal devaluations replicate all real variables and relative prices, the
equivalence extends immediately to this case.
32labor mobility of this type.37 An important qualiﬁcation in this case is that income taxes
need to be based on the source of income rather than the residency of the worker.
5 Numerical Illustration
In this section we numerically evaluate the impact of ﬁscal devaluations. We compare al-
locations and welfare across various cases of complete and incomplete ﬁscal devaluations.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the case when only a VAT-payroll tax swap is used with no change
in capital taxes, the case of an anticipated ﬁscal devaluation, the case of smaller than optimal
ﬁscal devaluation, and the case without seignorage transfer in a currency union.
To do this we calibrate a small open economy to some features of Spain and its recent
experience during the crisis. This is a variant of the model in Section 2, retaining the
functional forms and extended to include capital (Section 4.2). Wages are assume to be
sticky and prices ﬂexible.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas, Yt = AtN
t K
1 
t . We in addition incorporate
adjustment costs to capital and the accumulation equation for capital is given by:
It = Kt+1   (1   )Kt +
I
2

Kt+1
Kt
  
2
Kt;
where I controls the magnitude of adjustment costs to capital.
We focus on incomplete markets with only bonds denominated in the foreign currency
(that is in euros) and impose that the world interest rate facing domestic households depends
on the amount the country as a whole borrows. Speciﬁcally,
i

t+1 = i
 +  
 
e
B Bt+1   1

+ "r;t;
where B is the steady state debt level, i = (1=)   1. This assumption ensures that
the model is stationary: in the long run, debt returns to its steady state level following a
shock. The shock to borrowing costs "r;t is assumed to follow an AR(1) with autocorrelation
coeﬃcient r.
We incorporate nonzero initial taxes. The economy is initially at a steady state with
constant positive value added, payroll, capital and labor income taxes. The revenues from
these taxes are rebated to households in the form of a lump-sum transfer/tax. We set all
other taxes to zero. The exchange rate is pegged at 1.
37In contrast, ﬁscal implementation of the ﬁrst best allocation in Adao, Correia, and Teles (2009) requires
additional ﬁscal instruments under labor mobility.
33Table 1: Calibration values
Parameter Value
Discount factor  0.98
Risk aversion  5.00
Labor share  0.75
Depreciation rate  0.05
Frisch elasticity of labor supply ' 1 0.50
Disutility of labor  1.00
Home bias H 0.60
Capital adjustment cost parameter I 2.00
Semi-elasticity of M=P to i  1 0.2
Relative weight for utility from money  5  10 4
Note: other parameter values as reported in the text.
Parameter values The parameter values used in the simulation are listed in Table 1. The
time period is a quarter. Several parameters take values standard in the literature (see e.g.
Galí, 2008). Except when considering the ﬂexible wage case, we follow Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo (2011) and set the wage stickiness parameter w = 0:85 corresponding
roughly to a year and a half average duration of wages. The elasticity of substitution across
home varieties and across foreign varieties is assumed to be  = 4, a value near the middle
of a relatively wide range of estimates found in a large literature.38 For the elasticity of sub-
stitution across domestic and foreign varieties we assume a value of  = 1:2 to correspond
to the close to 1 value estimated in Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2010).
The tax rates are calibrated to the values for Spain in 2008 as reported in European
Commission (2011). The VAT rate,  v is set to 16% which is the ‘standard’ VAT rate.
The payroll tax,  p, is set at 18% and includes employers payroll taxes and social security
contributions. The capital tax,  R, is set to 18.3% to match the implicit tax rate on capital
and business income. The labor income tax rate,  n, is set to 14% to match the implicit tax
rate on labor from personal income tax and employees social security contributions.
The parameters for the utility of real money balances are chosen to match the ratio of
M1 to nominal GDP for the Euro area (0.36) and to be consistent with the literature that
emphasizes a low semi-elasticity of real money balances to interest rates. The initial debt to
GDP is calibrated to match the net foreign asset to GDP of Spain of  75% in 2008. This
corresponds to a B = B =  0:87
38For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) deﬁne a product variety as the interaction of an HTS 10-digit
code and country and obtain a median elasticity estimate of 2.9 and a mean elasticity estimate of 8.2.
34Shock At time zero, the economy is in its non-stochastic steady state. At time one, agents
are hit by an unexpected shock to their cost of borrowing. Given r = 0:95 to match the
persistent eﬀect of the shock, we calibrate "r to match the 4% decline in GDP in Spain
between 2008-2009. This corresponds to "r = 0:013.
Results Figure 1 plots the impulse response of the economy to the interest rate shock for
three cases: ﬂexible wages (F), sticky wages (S) and sticky wages with a 10% ﬁscal devalu-
ation (FD). This magnitude of devaluation mimics closely the movement in consumption in
the ﬂexible wage case.39 According to the formula in footnote 23, a 10% ﬁscal devaluation
translates into an increase in VAT of 7.6 percentage points (to 23.6%), a payroll tax cut of
10.7 percentage points (to 7.3%) and a capital tax cut of 10.8 percentage points (to 7.5%).
Note that the initial non-stochastic steady state is identical across all cases. All reported
variables are in percent deviation from their steady state values.
The increase in interest rates makes borrowing costly and leads to a substitution away
from consumption to savings. Since Spain is a net debtor in the initial steady state the
increase in interest rates has a negative income eﬀect that reinforces the substitution eﬀect
and further reduces consumption. The increase in interest rates leads to an increase in the
required rate of return on capital (consistent with the no-arbitrage condition between saving
in foreign bonds and in capital) and a decline in investment. The increase in savings and
decline in investment translates into an improvement in the trade balance. The extent of the
decline in consumption and investment and the impact on output and labor varies across
the three speciﬁcations and is tied to diﬀerential relative price movements.
In the case when wages are ﬂexible (F), the decline in relative demand for home goods
(given home-bias) induces a decline in the demand for labor and capital services. At the
same time the decline in consumption, through the wealth eﬀect, generates an increase in
labor supply for given real wages. The combined eﬀect is a decline in real wages (5%) and
a decline in wages relative to rental rates of capital. In our calibration the net eﬀect is an
increase in labor employment and an increase in output of 2.5%. The decline in relative
demand for home goods is associated with a sharp terms of trade depreciation of close to
10%, consistent with the decline in nominal wages and rental rates of capital.
When wages are sticky (S), the relative price movements are distorted because of the slow
downward adjustment in wages as seen in Figure 1. The price of home goods declines by a
39A one-time devaluation (nominal or ﬁscal) does not perfectly replicate the ﬂexible-wage equilibrium due
to the dynamics associated with adjustment in capital. Note that, as is well known, in the presence of
mark-ups and distortionary taxes, the ﬂexible price equilibrium is not ﬁrst best. Welfare under an exchange
rate devaluation can therefore be higher than in the ﬂexible price allocation.
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Figure 1: Impulse response to an interest rate shock
small amount and the terms of trade therefore depreciates by a little over 1% as compared to
the 10% depreciation in the ﬂexible price case. Since the terms-of-trade is over-appreciated
relative to the ﬂexible wage case the demand for domestic goods is too low. Similarly, real
wages decline gradually and the ratio of wages to the rental rate of capital increases in the
short-run, as opposed to decreasing as in the ﬂexible price case. The combined eﬀect is a
4.5% drop in labor, a 4% decline in output and a decline in the employment of labor relative
to capital. The direction of movement of labor and output diﬀers both qualitatively and
quantitatively from the ﬂexible price case.40
40It is useful to compare the sticky wage outcome to papers that have used interest rate shocks but with
ﬂexible prices. For instance, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) highlight the importance of attenuating wealth
eﬀects on labor supply to generate a negative comovement between interest rates and output. Further,
they require working capital to generate the required correlation. As is evident here, with pricing power
and wage rigidity, even without working capital and with preferences that allow for wealth eﬀects on labor
supply interest rate shocks can generate negative co-movement. An important diﬀerence is that wage rigidity
generates ineﬃcient relative price movements in the hiring of labor versus capital.
36The impulse responses in the sticky wage case line up qualitatively quite well with what
was observed in Spain following the crisis. The decline in output, consumption, labor,
investment and the improvement in the trade balance accord well with the facts for Spain.
The model generated decline in consumption is 3.8% , while in the data it is 4.9% between
2008–09. The trade balance as a ratio of GDP improves by 3.6% in the model generated data,
while empirically the improvement was 4.1%. The model generates a decline in investment
of 43% which is larger than in the data, where investment declined by 30% from its peak in
2007 to 2010.
The FD case is where under sticky wages, in the period when the interest rate shock hits,
the country implements a one-time (unexpected) permanent 10% ﬁscal devaluation (FD).
This intervention targets both the too-high real wage and the under-depreciated terms of
trade. The devaluation raises the domestic price of imported goods and reduces the foreign
price of exported goods, thus generating a larger depreciation of the terms of trade (8%)
than the case without the intervention (1.5%). The associated increase in the home price
level also brings about the relevant decline in real wages, close to the level in the ﬂexible
price case. While this one-time exchange rate intervention cannot replicate the ﬂexible price
allocations perfectly, it does quite well, as seen in the ﬁgures. The decline in consumption,
investment, improvement in the trade balance to GDP, and the increase in labor, output
and the ratio of employment to capital are quite close to the ﬂexible price case.
Lastly, we evaluate the welfare impact of a 10% devaluation (FD) relative to the case
without the ﬁscal devaluation (S). We perform a calculation à la Lucas (1987). That is
we compute the permanent per-period decline in consumption in the non-stochastic steady
state required to match the welfare following the interest rate shock, with and without the
ﬁscal devaluation. As is well known, in standard business cycle models the level eﬀects are
quite small. The relevant number is therefore the comparison across the diﬀerent cases.
The certainty equivalent consumption decline in the case of FD is 0.45%. Without the FD
intervention the certainty equivalent consumption decline is around 50% higher, at 0.64%. A
second measure is to restrict the consumption decline to a shorter time interval (as opposed to
a permanent decline). When restricted to 10 quarters, the constant per-period consumption
decline (relative to the initial steady state) is 2.55%. Without the ﬁscal devaluation, it is
again around 50% higher, at 3.65%. These numbers are reported in the ﬁrst two rows of
Table 2.
Incomplete ﬁscal devaluations: We now evaluate the impact of three deviations from
the complete unanticipated ﬁscal devaluation just described. First, we look at the case
37Table 2: Welfare loss under alternative policies
Consumption loss
Permanent 10 quarters
No intervention (S)  0.64%  3.65%
10% nominal or ﬁscal devaluation (FD)  0.45%  2.55%
Of this gap
— FD w/out capital tax cut (FD
~ K) 68%
— Anticipated ﬁscal devaluation (FDA) 79%
— 5% ﬁscal devaluation 53%
Note: welfare-equivalent steady state consumption loss (relative to welfare under no shock).
without the adjustment in capital taxes, and only an increase in the VAT and a reduction in
the payroll tax (FD
~ K). Second, we consider a one-quarter-ahead anticipated increase in the
VAT and a corresponding reduction in the payroll and capital taxes (FDA), but without any
change in the consumption or income taxes, as would be required to replicate an anticipated
nominal devaluation. Third, we consider an unanticipated ﬁscal devaluation, but excluding
the seigniorage revenues from the country budget constraint (FD
~ M), to capture the case of
a ﬁscal devaluation in a currency union without the transfer of seigniorage from the union
central bank to the devaluing country (see discussion in Section 4.1).
In all these cases, as we know from the theoretical discussion, the exact equivalence be-
tween a nominal and a ﬁscal devaluation is violated, and we now investigate the departures
from equivalence quantitatively. In the online supplement we report the impulse responses
under these alternative policies, and compare them with the impulse response under a com-
plete ﬁscal devaluation. The overall conclusion is that these incomplete policies generate
impulse responses that track closely the dynamic path in response to a complete policy.
Under (FD
~ K) the relative demand for capital is distorted, which leads to a larger drop in
investment and a larger improvement in the trade balance. Anticipated policy (FDA) gen-
erates a one-quarter decline in employment and output with a bounce back in all variables
in the following period to a level very close to the dynamic path of the unanticipated ﬁscal
devaluation (FD). The dynamic response to (FD
~ M), in the absence of seigniorage revenues,
is almost indistinguishable from that under a complete policy, reﬂecting the fact that in a
calibrated model the seigniorage revenues constitute a small fraction of a country’s GDP.
The welfare implications of incomplete ﬁscal devaluations are reported in the lower panel
of Table 2. Even when the ﬁscal devaluation is imperfect it signiﬁcantly closes the gap
between the no intervention and the full implementation welfare. In the case when only a
38VAT-payroll tax swap is used without any adjustment for capital taxes, the gap is closed by
68%. In the case when the ﬁscal devaluation is anticipated, it is closed by 79%. In the case
when the devaluation is halved in size, from 10% to 5%, it still covers 53% of the welfare gap.
Finally, the welfare gap between no intervention and a ﬁscal devaluation (even if imperfect) is
both signiﬁcant and increasing with the degree of wage rigidity (see the online supplement).
In September 2012 Spain raised the standard VAT from 18% to 21%, and for several
lower tax bracket items (e.g., haircuts, cinema and other entertainment) the tax increases
were even bigger. This VAT increase was not accompanied with payroll and capital tax
cuts as would be called for in a ﬁscal devaluation. When we simulate the impact of a 5%
VAT increase alongside the interest rate increase, without any other tax changes, welfare
is estimated to decline by more than in the case without any intervention. In the absence
of intervention welfare declines by 0.64%. The VAT increase instead reduces it by 0.88%,
emphasizing the essential role of a payroll tax cut alongside the VAT increase to capture the
beneﬁts of a devaluation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose two types of ﬁscal policies that can robustly implement allocations
stemming from a nominal devaluation, but in an economy with a ﬁxed exchange rate. Our
proposed ﬁscal devaluations have a number of appealing features. First, they can be imple-
mented unilaterally by one country using a small set of conventional ﬁscal instruments. In
particular, a one-time unanticipated ﬁscal devaluation can be implemented adjusting solely
the value-added and payroll taxes. Second, they are robust in the sense that they work
across a number of economic environments and require virtually no information about the
details of the microeconomic environment, in particular about the extent and nature of nom-
inal price and wage rigidity. Third, they are government revenue neutral. Clearly, there are
political economy constraints to the size of a feasible ﬁscal devaluation including tax evasion
considerations. Indeed there are limits to how high the VAT can be raised and how much
payroll taxes can be cut. An area that we leave for future research is the impact of these
factors on implementation. Nevertheless, our results suggest that ﬁscal devaluations oﬀer a
partial but attractive relaxation of Mundell’s impossible trinity, allowing for essentially the
same outcomes as under an active monetary policy while maintaining a ﬁxed exchange rate
and free capital ﬂows.
39Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Complete markets)
Conjecture that fCt;C
t g and the path of relative prices and wages is unchanged. Then from good
demand (1), goods-market clearing (9), production functions (8) and labor demand (18), it follows
that the rest of the equilibrium allocation is unchanged. In particular consumption and output of
individual varieties as well as labor input of individual households are unchanged. We now verify
the above conjecture by exploring the equilibrium conditions for price and wage settings, as well as
for aggregate consumption.
First, substitute the expression for stochastic discount factor (3) into the wage-setting equa-
tion (19). Given the rest of the allocation, the same path of f  Wt(h)g satisﬁes this condition when
1 + &c
t
1 + n
t
 1 , &c
t  n
t : (A.1)
Second, consider price setting by home ﬁrms for the home market as given by equations (13) under
PCP and by (14) under LCP, again after substituting in (3). Given the rest of the allocation, the
same path of reset prices f  PHt(i)g satisﬁes these conditions when:41
(1 + &c
t)(1   &
p
t )
1 + d
t

(1 + &c
t)(1   v
t )
1 + d
t
 1: (A.2)
Third, consider international price setting by home ﬁrms in the foreign market described by the law
of one price (12) under PCP and by equation (15) under LCP respectively. In both cases, f  P
Ht(i)g
stays unchanged provided that:42
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Fourth, consider international price setting by foreign ﬁrms in the home market described by the
law of one price (16) under PCP and by (17) under LCP. The same path of f  PFt(i)g satisﬁes these
conditions when
E0
t
1 + m
t
1   v
t
 Et ,
1 + m
t
1   v
t
 1 + t: (A.4)
Now by examining the two ﬁscal devaluation policies (FD0) and (FD00) we conclude that all
conditions (A.1)–(A.4) are satisﬁed in both cases, and therefore (given the conjecture we started
41To make the argument more transparent, one can rewrite, for example, the expression for the reset
price (13) under PCP as
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For exact equivalence of reset prices under a ﬁscal devaluation, the terms in the square brackets in both the
numerator and denominator should be identically unity state-by-state and period-by-period, as required by
condition (A.2).
42This requirement immediately follows from (12) under PCP, but (15) under LCP instead requires
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t )  1 + t:
However, combining it with (A.2) results in the same condition as under PCP.
40out with) both ﬁscal devaluations result in the same nominal reset wages and prices as a nominal
devaluation. Given motion equations for prices and wage dynamics (e.g., (11)) and the deﬁnitions
of price indexes (e.g., (2)), this implies that all nominal wages and prices (including price indexes)
are mimicked under both ﬁscal devaluation policies. This, in turn, implies in view of (A.3)–(A.4)
that the terms of trade deﬁned in (24) are also mimicked. To additionally mimic the behavior of the
real exchange rate in (26), we need to require E0
t(1 + &c
t)  Et, which together with (A.1) results in:
&c
t  n
t  t; (A.5)
also satisﬁed by (FD0) and (FD00).
We ﬁnally verify that the equilibrium values of fCt;C
t g associated with a nominal devaluation
are also equilibrium values under our ﬁscal devaluation policies. Under complete markets, the
international risk-sharing condition (25) becomes the familiar Backus-Smith condition (28), where
the constant of proportionality  is recovered from the intertemporal budget constraint of the
country and stays unchanged across nominal and ﬁscal devaluations provided that relative prices and
terms of trade follow the same path.43 As long as we have equivalence in all relative prices, including
the real exchange rate, from (28) we obtain equivalence in the relative consumption allocation. The
levels of consumption must also be equivalent under nominal and ﬁscal devaluations to satisfy the
aggregate resource constraint (aggregating (9)).
This completes the loop and veriﬁes that the conjecture we started out with is internally con-
sistent. That is, the equilibrium allocations of consumption, labor and output associated with a
nominal devaluation and both ﬁscal devaluations in (FD0) and (FD00) coincide.
Finally, under separable utility in money balances, money demand (5) is a side equation, and
hence imposes no additional constraints on implementation.44 Switching from nominal to ﬁscal
devaluation in general changes the path of the (shadow) nominal interest rate, and hence requires
an adjustment in money supply in order to satisfy the altered money demand. The required path of
the money supply under a ﬁscal devaluation policy fM0
tg can be recovered directly from (5) given
the rest of the allocation. 
A.2 Fiscal devaluations in ﬁnancial autarky
We provide a brief discussion of the case of ﬁnancial autarky (closed capital account), where the
set of risk sharing conditions (25) becomes empty (
t  ;), and the ﬂow budget constraint (23)
43Integrating forward the country ﬂow budget constraint (23) using the foreign stochastic discount factor
as weights, we arrive at the intertemporal budget constraint of the country
B0
P
0 E0
+ E0
1 X
t=0
t

C
t
C
0
  P
Ht
P
t
h
C
Ht   CFtSt
i
= 0;
where B0 is the home-currency initial net foreign asset position of the home country, and the second term
is the sum of all future trade surpluses of the home country discounted by state prices. Note from good
demand condition (1) that home and foreign consumption of imports, CFt and C
Ht, are functions of aggregate
consumption Ct and C
t , as well as relative price PFt=PHt and P
Ft=P
Ht respectively.
44Separability of real money balances in the utility function is a standard assumption in the literature and
implies that holdings of real money balances have no aﬀect on the marginal utility of consumption. Hence
our equivalence results do not require replicating the equilibrium path of real money balances. If on the
other hand we had non-separable utility, equivalence would require the use of an additional tax on money
holdings in order to reduce money demand under a ﬁscal devaluation. This is because expected nominal
devaluations result in an increased nominal interest rate and depressed money demand. Replicating an
unexpected devaluation, however, does not require an extra instrument even under non-separable utility.
41becomes a balanced trade requirement:
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where we used demand conditions (1) to substitute in for C
Ht and CFt. As a result, the real exchange
rate plays no role for the allocation as it shows up in no equilibrium condition, and therefore only
conditions (A.1)–(A.4) are needed to be satisﬁed by ﬁscal devaluation policies.45 Note that the
reduced ﬁscal devaluation policies (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) of Proposition 3 satisfy these requirements,
but under autarky we need not require that the devaluation is unanticipated.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (Unanticipated devaluations)
Following the steps of the proof of Proposition 1 (in Appendix A.1), the conditions to mimic the
path of wages and prices instead of (A.1)–(A.4) become simply:
1 + &c
t
1 + n
t
 1 and
1 + &x
t
1   v
t

1 + m
t
1   v
t
 1 + t; (A.6)
which are satisﬁed under both reduced devaluation policies (FD0
R) and (FD00
R). These conditions
do not impose a requirement on the use of proﬁt tax d
t , because under a one-time unexpected
devaluation policy it no longer aﬀects price setting in (13)–(15). Indeed, for price setting before
t = 0, no nominal or ﬁscal policy change is anticipated, so it does not aﬀect price setting; for t  0,
the change in either nominal or ﬁscal regime happens once and for all, and hence all taxes can be
moved outside the expectation in (13)–(15) and canceled out (also see the expression in footnote 41).
We still need to use proﬁt tax d
t if domestic equity is traded internationally in order to replicate
the eﬀects on the budget constraint (23) and international risk sharing (25), as shown in Lemma 1.
In particular, the path of Dhe
t = t=[(1 + d
t )Et] must be replicated under a ﬁscal devaluation,
which from the equation for proﬁts (10) requires d
t   for t  0 under (FD0
R) and d
t  0 under
(FD00
R). Whenever a home-currency debt is traded, a partial default (haircut) h
0 = =(1 + ) is
needed in the event (state-period) of a ﬁscal devaluation in order to replicate the valuation eﬀects
in the country budget constraint (23).
Since devaluation is one-time unanticipated, the path of the home nominal risk-free interest rate
is unaﬀected (and in fact, UIP holds in this case as interest parity, it+1 = i
t+1, in every period), and
therefore money demand in (5) is not aﬀected. As a result, with &c
t = 0, the same money supply as
under a nominal devaluation would also support the ﬁscal devaluation (M0
t = Mt), and hence real
balances are also unchanged.
Finally, with &c
t = 0, the path of the real exchange rate is not exactly mimicked relative to a
nominal devaluation, however this does not aﬀect the international risk sharing conditions (25).
This is because for t < 0 no policy change is anticipated (zero-probability event), and for t  0 the
policy change is once and for all, therefore leaving saving and portfolio choice decisions unaﬀected
before, after and at t = 0. Consequently, the same consumption allocation fCt;C
t g satisﬁes both
the country budget constraint (23) and the international risk sharing conditions (25) under both
reduced ﬁscal devaluation policies (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) as under a nominal devaluation. 
45Note that the domestic Euler equations (4) now become side equations and determine the intertemporal
asset prices given the home stochastic discount factor in (3) which need not follow the same path under a
nominal and a ﬁscal devaluation in this case.
42A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Revenue neutrality)
Part (i) follows immediately from (30) after substituting in t = m
t under (FD0) and t = v
t
under (FD00). To prove Part (ii), note that under both (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) we can rewrite
PtCt   WtNt =

PFtCFt   (1 + t)E0P
HtC
Ht

+

PHtCHt + (1 + t)E0P
HtC
Ht   WtNt

;
where the ﬁrst term is trade deﬁcit ( NXt) and the second term is proﬁts without taking into
account VAT and payroll subsidy (i.e., =(1 v
t ), since v
t = &
p
t under ﬁscal devaluations). We can
divide and multiple the second term by the dividend tax (1 + d
t ) to obtain:
PtCt   WtNt =  NXt + (1 + t)
t
1 + d
t
; (A.7)
since under both (FD0
R) and (FD00
R) we have (1 + d
t )=(1   v
t )  1 + t. Finally, substituting (A.7)
this resulting equation into (30), and imposing t = 0 and m
t = t or v
t = t under the two reduced
ﬁscal devaluations respectively, we obtain (31). 
We now prove an additional result that under one-time unanticipated ﬁscal devaluations the net
present value of additional government revenues is non-negative when the stock market capitalization
(plus the value of unincorporated business) exceeds the net foreign liabilities of a country:
Lemma A.1 Under (FD0
R) and (FD00
R), the net present value of the additional government revenues
equals  times the sum of net foreign assets and the capitalization of the business sector of the home
country at the time of the devaluation.
Proof: We make use of the budget constraint of the home country (23):
1
Et
Et

t;t+1Et+1B
t+1
	
  B
t = P
HtC
Ht   PFtCFt
1
Et
1   v
t
1 + m
t
;
where now B
t =
P
j2Jt 1(Q
j
t + D
j
t )B
j
t is the foreign-currency equilibrium payoﬀ of the home
country international asset portfolio at t (in a given state of the world), or equivalently the foreign-
currency net foreign assets (inclusive of period t returns) of the home country in the beginning of
period t.46
Using the NXt notation, we can rewrite
1
Et
Et

t;t+1Et+1B
t+1
	
  B
t =
NXt
(1 + t)E0
;
where we have used the fact that Et(1 + m
t )=(1   v
t ) = E0(1 + t) under both nominal and ﬁscal
devaluations. In the case of a one-time unanticipated devaluation (with t =  for t  0), we solve
the above equation forward starting from t = 0:
B0 = E0B
0 =  
P1
t=0 E0 f0;t  NXt=(1 + )g;
where we have imposed the transversality condition for the country international portfolio. Ex-
pressing out NXt=(1 + ) from (31) and substituting it into the intertemporal budget constraint,
we obtain
B0 =
P1
t=0 E0 f0;t  TRt=g   Qhe
0 ; where Qhe
0 =
P1
t=0 E0

0;t  t=(1 + d
t )
	
is the (shadow) value of the home business sector (stock market capitalization plus the value of
unincorporated businesses). Combining and multiplying through by  results in
P1
t=0 E0 f0;tTRtg =  
 
B0 + Qhe
0

: 
46Note that 1
EtEt

t;t+1Et+1B
t+1
	
= Et


t;t+1B
t+1
	
is the period t foreign-currency value of holding a
state-contingent net foreign asset position B
t+1 in period t + 1, where the equality holds in view of the risk
sharing conditions (25).
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